Three Essays in the Public Economics of Offshore Hydrocarbon Investment and Production. by Kearney, Owen P.
Three Essays in the Public Economics of Offshore
Hydrocarbon Investment and Production
by
Owen P. Kearney
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
(Economics)
in The University of Michigan
2011
Doctoral Committee:
Professor James R. Hines, Jr., Chair
Professor Thomas P. Lyon
Professor Joel B. Slemrod
Assistant Professor Ryan M. Kellogg
c© Owen P. Kearney 2011
All Rights Reserved
For Kelly and Lars
ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The support of many individuals both inside and outside of the Department of
Economics at the University of Michigan made this dissertation possible.
Foremost among those within the university are my committee members. First, I
would like to thank my committee chair, Jim Hines. He provided invaluable advice
and encouragement while showing great patience during the dissertation-writing pro-
cess. In addition, more than ten years ago, Jim encouraged me to continue studying
economics when I was a Master of Public Policy student enrolled in his public finance
course, a class that solidified my interest in and intellectual commitment to public
economics. Ryan Kellogg similarly gave excellent insights and suggestions, while also
sharing his in depth knowledge of the oil and gas industry. It is not an exaggeration
to say that both Jim’s and Ryan’s commitment to regular joint meetings during my
last year of graduate school allowed me to complete my job market paper and dis-
sertation. My other committee members, Tom Lyon and Joel Slemrod, offered keen
insights on both the content of my research and how to market it to the intended
audience and I am grateful to them for their support. Finally, Jim and Ryan gener-
ously shared data on the output gap and data on oil and natural gas futures contract
prices, respectively.
Other faculty members and students in the Department, past and present, also
provided helpful comments on this research. In particular, I would like to thank
David Agrawal, Adam Cole, Lucas Davis, Ann Ferris, Osborne Jackson, Brian Rowe,
Matt Rutledge, and Dan Simundza. In addition, I would especially like to thank
iii
Stephan Lindner, who not only provided insightful thoughts on this research, but
also helped me push through thoughts and doubts too numerous to let progress come
easily. Of course, many seminar participants at the University of Michigan, the Joint
Committee on Taxation, the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Congressional Budget
Office, and the Bureau of Economic Analysis also provided many helpful comments.
Outside of the Department there are fewer people to thank, but the importance of
these individuals cannot be understated. I would like to thank my parents, Tom and
Sharon Kearney, for putting a high value on my education from an early age. I would
also like to thank my parents-in-law, Tom and Tammy Dunham, for always taking
a strong interest in my progress towards the degree and the day-to-day wellbeing of
both me and their daughter.
Finally, my wife, Kelly Dunham, has provided moral (and material) support
through the many years that were required to finish the doctoral degree. She has
sacrificed many things to make this possible and I hope that I can repay her in some
measure in the years to come.
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DEDICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
CHAPTER
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
II. Production Taxation and Offshore Oil Investment: Evidence
from the Gulf of Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2 Institutional Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2.1 U.S. Federal Offshore Oil and Gas Leasing . . . . . 8
2.2.2 The Deep Water Royalty Relief Act . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3 Theoretical Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3.1 Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3.2 General Optimization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3.3 Predictions with and without Price-based Royalty
Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.4 Empirical Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.4.1 Implementation of the Theoretical Model . . . . . . 22
2.4.2 Data and Data Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.4.3 Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.5.1 Acquisition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.5.2 Bidding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.5.3 Exploration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.5.4 Some Closing Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
v
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.7 Appendix: The Deep Water Royalty Relief Act . . . . . . . . 38
2.8 Appendix: Derivation of Estimator for E[Ne] . . . . . . . . . 39
III. Estimates of the Value of Information Externalities in Oil and
Gas Exploration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.2 U.S. Federal Offshore Oil and Gas Leasing . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.3.1 Discoveries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.3.2 Discovery Leases and Neighbor Leases . . . . . . . . 64
3.3.3 Firms and Securities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.3.4 Commodity Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.4 Event Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.5 Empirical Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.5.1 Regression Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.5.2 Regression Models: Baseline Specifications . . . . . 72
3.5.3 Regression Models: Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.5.4 Results and Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.7 Appendix: Examining differences between Figures 3.2 and 3.4 80
IV. Secondary Recovery and Oil Price . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
4.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
4.4 Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
4.4.1 Primary Recovery Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
4.4.2 Secondary Recovery Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
4.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
4.5.1 Empirical Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
4.5.2 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
4.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
V. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
vi
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure
2.1 Area (upper) and block (lower) maps for CGM and WGM. . . . . . 43
2.2 Reserve bids for CGM lease offerings, 1983-2008. . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.3 Annual rent for CGM lease offerings, 1983-2008. . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.4 Oil prices, 1996-2009. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.5 Natural gas prices, 1996-2009. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.6 Acquisition of deep water leases, 1984-2000. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.7 Bidding for deep water leases, 1984-2000. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.8 Quantile regression semi-elasticity estimates for DWRRA indicator. 48
3.1 Set of neighbor blocks for a lease of standard size and shape. . . . . 84
3.2 Mean cumulative abnormal returns (weighted by market capitaliza-
tion, then averaged) for publicly-traded firms that own discovery leases. 85
3.3 Mean cumulative abnormal returns (weighted by market capitaliza-
tion, then averaged) for publicly-traded firms owning leases that
neighbor a discovery lease. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.4 Coefficient estimates: βt and
∑
βt in (3.2). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.5 Coefficient estimates: γt and
∑
γt in (3.2). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3.6 Coefficient estimates: βt and
∑
βt in (3.3). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.7 Coefficient estimates: δt and
∑
δt in (3.3). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
vii
3.8 Coefficient estimates: γt and
∑
γt in (3.3). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.9 Distributions of distance variable for discovery and neighbor leases. 92
3.10 Coefficient estimates: (βt + ζtd distit) and
∑
(βt + ζtd distit) in (3.4). 93
3.11 Coefficient estimates: (δt + θtd distit) and
∑
(δt + θtd distit) in (3.4). 94
3.12 Coefficient estimates: (γt + ηtd distit) and
∑
(γt + ηtd distit) in (3.4). 95
3.13 Coefficient estimates: (βt + ιtp0) and
∑
(βt + ιtp0) in (3.5). . . . . . 96
3.14 Coefficient estimates: (δt + λtp0) and
∑
(δt + λtp0) in (3.5). . . . . . 97
3.15 Coefficient estimates: (γt + κtp0) and
∑
(γt + κtp0) in (3.5). . . . . . 98
3.16 Coefficient estimates: ιtp0 and
∑
ιtp0 in (3.6). . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
3.17 Coefficient estimates: λtp0 and
∑
λtp0 in (3.6). . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
3.18 Coefficient estimates: κtp0 and
∑
κtp0 in (3.6). . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
3.19 Comparison of cumulative abnormal returns computed using means
and OLS estimates. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.1 OGOR-A Form. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
4.2 Water injection in U.S. Gulf of Mexico, 1985-2010. . . . . . . . . . . 121
4.3 Field age at month of water injection for samples 1 and 2. . . . . . 122
4.4 Marginal effects of oil price by well depth. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
viii
LIST OF TABLES
Table
2.1 DWRRA suspension volumes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.2 Acquired and explored deep water leases by depth and policy regime. 50
2.3 Acquisition – descriptive statistics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.4 Acquisition – logit model marginal effect estimates. . . . . . . . . . 52
2.5 Bidding – descriptive statistics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.6 Bidding – coefficient estimates (estimates for constant term unre-
ported). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.7 Exploration – descriptive statistics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.8 Exploration – logit model marginal effect estimates for characteristics
of individual lease-month. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.9 Exploration, continued – logit model marginal effect estimates for
quantities of neighboring blocks/leases in different states of develop-
ment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.1 Estimates for baseline specification (3.2). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
3.2 Estimates for specification (3.3). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.1 Frequencies by data level in OGOR-A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
4.2 Descriptive statistics for sample 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
4.3 Descriptive statistics for sample 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
ix
4.4 Estimates for sample 1 – SE’s clustered on string. . . . . . . . . . . 126
4.5 Estimates for sample 2 – SE’s clustered on string. . . . . . . . . . . 126
4.6 Estimates for sample 1 – SE’s clustered on field. . . . . . . . . . . . 127
4.7 Estimates for sample 2 – SE’s clustered on field. . . . . . . . . . . . 127
x
CHAPTER I
Introduction
Oil and natural gas account for approximately 60% of the energy produced world-
wide. An already large and growing share of this total is due to oil and natural gas
from offshore wells, particularly those in so-called “deep water” (at least several hun-
dred meters deep). This implies that national governments, as both resource owner
and taxing authority, currently have and will continue to play an outsize role in the
development of this new energy source. First, to the extent that they permit out-
side (of the public sector) involvement to develop these resources at all, governments
design the agreements to transfer mineral rights to private sector entities, while still
retaining ultimate ownership. Second, these resources constitute an attractive source
of government revenue: because the hydrocarbon source is immobile, taxable rents
cannot flee the jurisdiction in which they are generated.
A thorough understanding of how hydrocarbon-producing firms respond to the
government’s policy choices is essential in order to evaluate the overall economic
efficiency of these choices. In this dissertation, I use microdata collected by the
U.S. federal government on oil and natural gas leasing in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico to
measure how firms and markets behave in this policy environment.
In Chapter 1, I estimate the investment responses of hydrocarbon producers to
a policy called the Deep Water Royalty Relief Act (DWRRA) which suspends the
1
royalty, a type of production tax levied on oil and natural gas extracted from federal
lands. I find that the potential for a royalty payments waiver: (1) increases the prob-
ability that an individual tract is acquired by an average of 193% (a mean increase of
5.6 percentage points); (2) decreases the probability that a lease is ever drilled during
its observed lease term by an average of 14.5% (a mean decrease of 1.3 percentage
points); and (3) increases the expected number of explored leases by 150%. The intro-
duction of DWRRA also increases the average winning bid per lease by 60%. These
estimates quantify the magnitudes of the discouraging effects of production taxation
on oil and natural gas investment.
In Chapter 2, I quantify the implied value of information spillovers in oil and nat-
ural gas exploration using an event study design. Examining cumulative unpredicted
daily stock returns for firms owning leases adjacent to a lease where a hydrocarbon
discovery occurs during the trading days immediately preceding and following that
discovery, I interpret the accumulated returns as the value of new information. I find
that 25 trading days after a discovery, firms that own leases adjacent to the discovery
lease (but not the discovery lease, itself) realize an average abnormal return that
translates to $315 million in market capitalization. This effect is quantitatively large
compared to average costs for drilling an exploratory well.
In Chapter 3, I measure how oil price affects water injection, a method for pro-
longing the productive lifetime of oil fields. I find that a $1 rise in price increases the
water injected into the well’s reservoir by approximately 650 to 950 barrels, equalling
7.5 to 9.5% of the mean monthly injection volume (depending on the sample cho-
sen). Equating the estimated price effect with a potential tax effect, this finding has
implications for how the government levies a royalty on mature oil fields for which
operators invest in pressure maintenance.
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CHAPTER II
Production Taxation and Offshore Oil Investment:
Evidence from the Gulf of Mexico
2.1 Introduction
The U.S. government has authority over all submerged lands between three and
200 miles from its shores, including the estimated 101 billion barrels of oil and 480
trillion cubic feet of natural gas contained within this area, known as the Outer
Continental Shelf, or OCS (Minerals Management Service (2006)).1 The potential
extraction of these resources represents substantial rents to the U.S. government: in
fiscal year 2009, for example, the 367 million barrels of oil and 3.35 trillion cubic
feet of natural gas produced in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico generated approximately
$3.72 billion in royalty payments.2 The federal government contracts with private
industry for the development and extraction of these offshore resources – a multi-
year process spanning several stages of investment – by leasing individual tracts to
producing firms. Within these arrangements, the U.S. requires the payment of a
royalty (a fixed-percentage tax levied on the price of each produced unit of oil or
1These estimates refer to “technically recoverable but undiscovered resources,” i.e. those that
would be producible if not necessarily economically viable with current technology. For perspective,
the U.S. consumed roughly 6.4 billion barrels of oil and 23 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in 2008
(U.S. Energy Information Administration (2010)); from Table 1.3 and author’s calculations.
2Source: Office of Natural Resources Revenue website, http://www.onrr.gov.
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natural gas), however, the government enacted the Deep Water Royalty Relief Act
(DWRRA) during the mid-1990s which waived royalty payments for Gulf of Mexico
leases in greater than 200m of water for a limited time. In this paper, I use lease-level
microdata from the U.S. Gulf of Mexico to determine how the royalty suspension
induced by DWRRA changed firms’ investment behavior prior to the production of
oil and natural gas.
In my preferred estimates, I find that eligibility for the removal of royalty liabil-
ity increases the predicted conditional probability of a tract being purchased by an
average of 5.6 percentage points, which in percentage terms is 193%. DWRRA sta-
tus also decreases the number of leases that are ever drilled during their lease terms
(as measured by the cumulative distribution function for the first instance of a lease
having an exploratory well, F (·)). The CDF evaluated at T , the last period during
which the lease is observed (see Appendix B for a more complete description of T )
is lowered by 14.5% on average (or, 1.3 percentage points) by the presence of the
royalty. Finally, I combine these point estimates within an estimator for the change
in the expected number of explored leases due to the potential royalty waiver; I find
an increase in the expected number of explored leases of 150%.3
The estimates reported above suggest that firms respond to a policy that lowers
their taxes owed on production by both buying more leases and drilling more leases.
The signs of these effects are sensible, as lower royalty liability ceteris paribus increases
the value of the producing lease and therefore the value of the option to explore. The
purpose of this paper, however, is to estimate the magnitudes of these effects. In order
to estimate the sizes of these effects, I first construct detailed histories of leased and
unleased spells for each deep water tract sold or available at any point during 1984-
2000 in the Gulf of Mexico, using U.S. Department of Interior data. With these data, I
control for observable measures of lease quality and then exploit both within-variation
3Very few leases ever reach the production phase, so I am unable to make any inferences about
how the suspension of the royalty rate affects ultimate production.
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(treatment depends on a price threshold) and between-variation (treatment depends
on lease vintage) induced by DWRRA to estimate its effects within an empirical
model of sequential investment.
A simple comparison of the relative magnitudes (and signs) of the reported effects
does much to characterize the firms’ behavioral responses to the royalty change. The
combination of a large positive estimated value for the semi-elasticity for acquisition
with respect to the policy and an analogous semi-elasticity for the CDF for the time
of first exploratory drilling that is negative and smaller in magnitude implies that
acquisition is more sensitive to the royalty than is exploration. Given that leases
are sampled from a finite stock of tracts, and assuming minimally informed priors,
tracts for which purchase is induced by the royalty treatment will be of lower quality,
on average, than leases for which acquisition is inframarginal to the policy. There-
fore, the inflow of leases that compose the acquisition response must necessarily be
of lower mean quality and thus less likely to receive further investment in the form
of exploratory drilling. Potential leaseholders reacted to the possible suspension of
royalty payments by speculatively investing in such marginal leases, though the con-
ditions that could have caused firms to exercise (more of) these options failed to
materialize. While the policy’s affect on exploration conditional on acquisition is
unambiguously negative, the estimated effect on the raw number of leases drilled is
positive, as predicted by theory.
This research has a number of policy-relevant implications. First, knowledge of
firms’ behavioral responses to a royalty waiver both informs the evaluation of DWRRA
and also provides guidance to policymakers in crafting potential future tax incentive
policies targeted at extractive industries. Regarding the latter, the estimated treat-
ment effects suggest that royalty incentives can be an effective means for encouraging
investment subsequent to acquisition.4 This research also sheds light on a norma-
4Short of performing a simulation, it is not possible to characterize the effect of the royalty sus-
pension on overall government revenue as these data are severely right censored from the standpoint
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tively undesirable effect of the policy: increased lease holdings unaccompanied by a
commensurate increase in drilling. With the record oil prices that occurred during the
summer of 2008, some members of Congress asserted that leaseholders should engage
in more drilling and waved the threat of a firm-specific moratorium for future leases
or fines if new exploration did not materialize. While drilling capital constraints make
the industry-wide level of investment advocated by members of Congress impossible
(at least in the short run), the “inflated” lease holdings seem a response to the will
of an earlier Congress to encourage more investment.
This research also contributes to our understanding of optimal leasing policy. Le-
land (1978) develops a theory for the optimal risk-sharing between the government
and private firms for OCS oil and natural gas production. He concludes that the
imposition of the royalty, although simple to understand and administer, is incon-
sistent with the efficient outcome because it induces too little investment, and that
a higher royalty rate exacerbates this departure from optimality. Thus, movement
away from the royalty towards other modes of rent capture might accordingly be
welfare-improving. An obvious candidate is the winning bid, which theory predicts
will capitalize (at least some of) the lost government revenue from a lower royalty.
Wilson (1977) theorizes that as the number of bidders at auction increases (and thus
the market better approximates a perfectly competitive one), the winning bid will
fully capitalize any changes in expected tax payments. Although this paper does
not constitute a test of the relative efficiency of winning bids vs. royalties, the large
increase in the bid amount in response to the temporary lifting of royalty liability
indicates capitalization occurs. Therefore an emphasis on the bid for the purpose of
rent capture need not lower overall revenue greatly.
Additionally, this paper addresses two separate literatures: OCS hydrocarbon
leasing and investment, and the taxation of oil and natural gas production. The
of production (a lease can produce for decades) and the estimated effect on bidding provides only a
partial picture.
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former literature is focused almost exclusively on strategic interaction – to an extent
that the primary interest is not in OCS oil and gas leasing per se but rather in OCS oil
and gas leasing as a useful environment in which to test theoretical models of strategic
interaction, particularly in the context of incomplete and asymmetric information.
Porter (1995) summarizes much of this literature and attributes the appeal of OCS
leasing and production data to its detail and the fact that it is generated in a easily
understood strategic environment. Using OCS auction data for 1954-1969, Hendricks
et al. (1987) finds that the data are consistent with an auctions model in which one
bidder is better informed than the others. Hendricks and Porter (1988) examines
OCS “drainage” lease auctions during the period 1959-1969 and Hendricks et al.
(1989) extends the sample period to 1959-1979.5 Testing the hypothesis that the
owners of the producing leases possess more information about the offered neighboring
tracts than the competing bidders, the authors find observed bidding behavior to be
consistent with a model of asymmetrically informed bidders. Hendricks et al. (2003)
extends the analysis of first-price sealed bid auctions to “wildcat” lease auctions held
during 1954-19706 – an environment characterized by symmetric information between
bidders – to find that observed bidding is consistent with a symmetric common values
model. Finally, Hendricks and Porter (1996) analyzes exploratory drilling on wildcat
lease during the period 1954-1980, finding that a noncooperative model of drilling is
appropriate for these data. None of this research, however, addresses taxation and
its effects on firm behavior.
Turning next to the literature on the taxation of oil and natural gas production:
empirical estimation of the effect of production taxation is complicated by the fact
that the rate has not varied over time. This has necessitated the use of simulations
in order to understand how different types of taxes affect efficiency and equity –
5Prior to the current area-wide leasing regime (see section 2.2.1), the government periodically
conducted drainage auctions in which tracts adjacent to a producing lease were offered for bid.
6A wildcat lease is tract in an area where no previous drilling has occurred and thus no potential
participant holds an informational advantage.
7
a leading example is Gamponia and Mendelsohn (1985). A recent empirical study
in this area is Rao (2009). Using data for onshore oil wells during 1977-2008, she
exploits variation in the federal Windfall Profit Tax to estimate an after-tax price
elasticity of production of roughly 0.23. In contrast to Rao (2009), which estimates
the effect of taxes on existing wells only, this paper estimates the effect of taxes on
the investment decisions that necessarily precede production.7 In estimating on the
effect of (production) taxes on pre-production investment decisions, this paper fills a
gap in the literature.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: section 2 provides background on federal
offshore oil and natural gas leasing in general and DWRRA in particular. Section 3
outlines a theoretical model that generates predictions for behavioral changes owing
to a change in the royalty rate. Section 4 describes the empirical implementation
of the theoretical model and the data used for estimation. Section 5 presents and
discusses the results while section 6 concludes.
2.2 Institutional Background
2.2.1 U.S. Federal Offshore Oil and Gas Leasing
The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement (BOEMRE)
within the U.S. Department of Interior leases subsea tracts on the OCS to individ-
ual private firms or consortia of private firms.8 These tracts (called “blocks” when
unleased and “leases” when leased) are underwater parcels of land that usually mea-
sure three miles by three miles, covering an area of nine square-miles or 5,760 acres.
For administrative purposes, BOEMRE divides the Gulf of Mexico under U.S. ju-
7One exception is Ashton et al. (2005), a study commissioned by the Mineral Management Service
to examine the effects of changes in royalty policy. The authors do not provide a model to underpin
their empirical results, which are generated from specifications that are quite different from those
given in this paper.
8BOEMRE is the agency that succeeded the Mineral Management Service (MMS), which ceased
to exist with the issue of Interior Secretary Ken Salazar’s Order 3299 on May 19, 2010.
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risdiction into three so-called planning areas: the Western Gulf of Mexico (WGM),
the Central Gulf of Mexico (CGM), and the Eastern Gulf of Mexico (EGM). Each
planning area is then subdivided into so-called areas (the purpose of which seems to
be block identification only) with each area completely gridded into individual num-
bered blocks (see Figure 2.1 for maps of the Central and Western Gulf of Mexico
planning areas divided into both areas and blocks). Finally, one additional system
of block categorization requires mention. BOEMRE divides blocks into water depth
categories: 0-199m, 200-399m, 400-799m, 800-1599m, etc. These distinctions matter
inasmuch as BOEMRE slightly varies lease contract terms by depth category. The
most substantial difference is between the 0-199m group, which BOEMRE adminis-
tratively considers “shallow” water, and all other depth groups, which are considered
“deep” water.9
Individual blocks are leased in individual first-price sealed bid auctions. Generally
speaking, a single “lease offering,” which constitutes thousands of simultaneous first-
price sealed bid auctions, is held one time per calendar year per planning area for all
blocks in the planning area that are not leased at the time of the lease offering.10 The
practice of making all blocks not currently leased available for bid is called “area-wide
leasing,” a framework that BOEMRE adopted beginning with lease offering 72 held
on May 25, 1983 (prior to that lease sale, only a limited number of geographically
grouped blocks were ever made available for a given sale, though these sets of available
blocks differed from sale-to-sale).
For each lease offering, BOEMRE announces a reserve bid per block acre, possibly
varying by water depth category. For all blocks available in a given lease offering
within a given depth category, the reserve bid is constant. Figure 2.2 plots the
reserve bid levels by water depth group for the 26 CGM lease offerings conducted
9For all lease offerings beginning with 178-1 on March 28, 2001, BOEMRE classifies any block in
the 200-399m depth category as shallow.
10This is true for CGM and WGM lease offerings, however, BOEMRE has conducted EGM lease
offerings only very intermittently, in fact, no EGM lease offerings occurred during 1988-2001.
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by BOEMRE during 1983-2008 (the analogous plot for WGM lease offerings during
the same time period is essentially identical). In addition to posting a reserve bid,
BOEMRE also tries to encourage competitiveness by limiting which consortia can be
formed by prospective bidders. Specifically, the largest firms in the industry cannot
legally submit joint bids.11
Roughly one month prior to a specific lease offering, BOEMRE issues a Final
Notice of Sale (FNOS) in the Federal Register for potential lessees which stipulates
sale-specific information, lease contract requirements, and block availability. Bids are
received, opened, and publicly read aloud by midnight on the day of the lease sale.
BOEMRE then undertakes an evaluation period to ensure that high bids provide “fair
market value” for the leased public resource.12 It is during this time that BOEMRE
can reject a high bid, even if the high bid exceeds the announced reserve (for the
52 lease offerings held during 1983-2008, BOEMRE rejected the high bids for 278 of
10,382 blocks purchased in deep water, or 2.68%).
The prospective leaseholder that submits the highest bid then receives exclusive
rights to explore and develop the lease for a term of five years (200-399m), eight
years (400-799m), or ten years (≥ 800m) depending on the block’s depth category (in
parentheses). If the leaseholder does not begin production of hydrocarbons during this
term, then the lease is returned to the government to be made available in subsequent
auctions.13 Although, any activity which BOEMRE classifies as “operations,” which
includes drilling, can extend the lease beyond its primary term (Minerals Management
Service (2001), page 50). During the period prior to production, the leaseholder pays
an annual rental fee per lease acre which is due on the anniversary of the lease
11As the level of concentration within upstream oil production has varied over time, so too has
BOEMRE’s “List of Restricted Joint Bidders.” The membership on the list covering the period from
November 1, 2003 through April 30, 2004, however, constitutes a useful snapshot: Exxon Mobil,
Shell, BP, TOTAL, Chevron Texaco, and Conoco Phillips.
12For the 52 lease offerings conducted during 1983-2008, the average time between successful lease
purchase and lease issue was 79 days for deep water blocks.
13Leases with eight-year terms are canceled if an exploratory well is not drilled within the first
five years (Minerals Management Service (2001), page 50).
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becoming effective. Figure 2.3 shows the annual rental fee for the various depth
groups and for different years of sale – e.g. for a 5,760 acre lease sold in 1996 in greater
than 800m of water, the total rental was $43,200 per year or $432,000 (in nominal
terms) over the lifetime of the lease. The leaseholder can avoid these payments by
relinquishing the lease, i.e. ending the lease term early by surrendering all rights to the
acquired block. BOEMRE then re-offers the block for sale at the next lease offering.
Following the drilling of an exploratory well, the leaseholder is required to submit
technical data gathered during the drilling process to BOEMRE (30 CFR 250.116).
Upon review of these data, BOEMRE determines whether the well is “qualifying,”
i.e. whether the well (and by extension, the lease) is “capable of production in paying
quantities.” Once a lease is deemed producible, BOEMRE assigns it to a “field.”14
Whereas the lease is the administrative unit within the OCS of the Gulf of Mexico,
the field is the geologic unit (and can be comprised of more than one lease).
If and only if the leaseholder commences hydrocarbon production on the lease fol-
lowing successful exploration is the lease renewed indefinitely. In this case, BOEMRE
waives rental fees and begins royalty collection. For any leases in depths of less than
400m sold prior to 2007, the royalty rate applied to production in the absence of any
policy-induced adjustments is 16.67%; the analogous rate for leases in water more
than 400m deep is 12.5%. For example, if a lease produces oil, the for each barrel
of oil extracted, the leaseholder remits to the federal government the product of the
royalty rate and the per-barrel price. Royalty collection, along with the bid and
rental payments, constitutes one of the government’s mechanisms for capturing rents
generated from the production of its leased resources. Finally, once the lease has
reached the end of its productive life, it is decommissioned and the block is returned
to BOEMRE.
14BOEMRE defines a field as “an area consisting of a single reservoir or multiple reservoirs all
grouped on, or related to, the same general geological structural feature and/or stratigraphic trap-
ping condition. There may be two or more reservoirs in a field that are separated vertically by
intervening impervious strata, or laterally by local geologic barriers, or both” (61 FR 12027).
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2.2.2 The Deep Water Royalty Relief Act
For leases sold during the period 1996-2000 in waters greater than 200m deep in
CGM and WGM, the Deep Water Royalty Relief Act conditionally waives royalty
payments on hydrocarbon production (Appendix A provides a detailed summary of
the provisions and implementation of DWRRA).15 If τ r and pt are the royalty rate
and the resource price during the t-th period (of n periods) in calendar year y, for
blocks sold prior to the enactment of DWRRA, the leaseholder remits τ rpt per unit
of the extracted resource during period t. For eligible deep water blocks sold during
1996-2000, however, the leaseholder remits τ rt (pt)pt where
τ rt (pt) =
 0 if p¯y ≤ pˆy and
∑
q ≤ Qˆ;
τ r otherwise,
(2.1)
where pˆy is the pre-set threshold value and p¯y =
∑n
t=1 pt,
∑
q represents cumulative
production from the specific deep water field, and Q˜ is the suspension volume for the
field (where the average and threshold prices are for the commodity that the lease
is actually producing). The suspension volume is the maximum quantity of oil or
natural gas that can be extracted from the field royalty-free and is meant to limit
how large a tax expenditure DWRRA can become. Table 2.1 lists the suspension
volumes by water depth in units of BOE (“barrel of oil equivalent” where one BOE
equals 5,620 ft.3 of natural gas or one barrel of oil).
In words, (2.1) means that for an eligible lease sold during 1996-2000, BOEMRE
waives royalty liability on production during calendar year y if the average sale price
for a unit of the commodity in that year is below the pre-specified threshold and
cumulative production from that lease’s field does not exceed the suspension volume.
If either of these conditions is unmet, then leases sold during 1996-2000 must pay the
15Royalty payments are not waived for leases which, otherwise eligible for royalty relief, were
subsequently assigned to a field containing at least one lease that produced prior to November 25,
1995 (61 FR 12022). This applies to 11 of 3,540 deep water leases sold during 1996-2000.
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same royalty rate as those leases sold prior to the enactment of DWRRA. BOEMRE
originally set the price threshold values as $28 per barrel of oil and $3.50 per million
Btu of natural gas in 1994. These values have been adjusted each year according to
the implicit price deflator for GDP as reported by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
To summarize: for a producing lease, two calendar years are relevant for deter-
mining whether the leaseholder must pay royalties: the vintage year and the current
calendar year. In order to be eligible for royalty relief, a lease must have as its vin-
tage year any of 1996-2000. Conditional on eligibility, in order to actually receive a
royalty waiver, average price in the current calendar year must fall below a threshold
value (ignoring the cumulative production stipulation). Therefore, production from
an eligible lease can be royalty-free after calendar year 2000, the last year in which
DWRRA eligible leases were sold. In fact, because price thresholds were not exceeded,
eligible oil production was royalty-free for every year until 2003 and eligible natural
gas production was royalty free during 1996-2000 and 2002. Figures 2.4 and 2.5 and
the accompanying tables show the nominal price trends, average nominal prices, and
threshold prices for oil and natural gas, respectively, for 1996-2009.
DWRRA provides variation for empirically estimating how royalty liability affects
investment decisions. In later sections, (1) I employ cross sectional variation (eligibil-
ity for and expectation of royalty relief at time of sale, by sale) to estimate the effects
on acquisition and bidding; and (2) I exploit cross sectional and time series variation
(eligibility for and expectation of royalty relief at time of sale or any later point) to
estimate exploration effects.
2.3 Theoretical Framework
The production of offshore oil and natural gas is preceded by several stages of
investment. In chronological order, these are:
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1. acquisition: purchase of a lease by submitting the highest (accepted) bid;
2. exploration: observation of deposit size on the lease;
3. development: installation of extraction infrastructure on the lease.
In this section, I construct a simple sequential investment model in order to make
precise the mechanisms by which the introduction of a price-conditional royalty policy
(e.g. DWRRA) affects the acquisition, bidding, and exploration decisions. The model
generates predictions vis-a`-vis the policy which I will later test in the data.
2.3.1 Setup
The generation of income from a hydrocarbon lease is preceded by a sequential
investment problem. I imagine the firm’s problem occurring over four periods: t =
1, 2, 3, 4, where each period corresponds to one stage of the firm’s decision: acquisition,
exploration, development, and production, respectively. In the first stage, at t = 1,
the firm decides whether or not to acquire the block and how much to bid for it. In the
second stage, at t = 2, the leaseholder decides to either explore the lease or relinquish
it. Then, in the third, at t = 3, the firm develops the lease or not depending on the
exploration outcome and beliefs about future prices, where the future is t = 4. Note
that in this framework, I do not model the firm’s production decision at t = 4.
The goal of the model is to derive an expression for the change in the expected
value of a given lease due to the introduction of a price-conditional royalty relief
policy (e.g. DWRRA) as a function of the model’s underlying parameters. I begin
by introducing the parameters, a few of which are already familiar: pt is the period
t resource price; Q is the random variable for the quantity of the resource on the
lease where q is the associated realization; τ and τ r are the corporate income tax and
royalty rates, respectively; kE and kD are the costs of exploration and development,
respectively; ρ is the rental payment for a single period; and r˜ is the rate of return from
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the next best investment opportunity. Finally, for analytical tractability, I impose
the following assumptions:
1. pt evolves according to a discrete time random walk: pt+1 = pt + εt+1, with
f(·) and Fε(·) being the density and distribution functions, respectively, for ε.
Furthermore, let n · ε ∼ Fnε(·).
2. Q can assume one of two possible values:
Q =
 q˜ with probability R;0 with probability 1−R.
3. Firms are risk neutral.
4. Variable costs of production zero.
5. Costs are immediately expensed (fully deductible from income subject to the
corporate income tax).
6. Values realized next period are discounted by factor β ≡ (1 + r˜)−1.
2.3.2 General Optimization
The leaseholder’s objective is relatively straightforward: to invest in the current
stage if it is “profitable” to do so with the goal of eventually arriving at the production
phase. Defining the following objects:
Vt = period t accounting profits from the investment;
V ∗t = period t economic profits from the investment;
OC = opportunity cost of the investment,
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I can present the firm’s general optimization problem at stage t:
max{Pr[Vt > 0]E[Vt|Vt > 0], OC}.
Therefore, the leaseholder’s investment rule in period t is as follows:
invest if Pr[Vt > 0]E[Vt|Vt > 0]−OC > 0, (2.2)
i.e. invest if expected economic profits are positive conditional on accounting profits
being positive. This general condition will be applied repeatedly in the section imme-
diately following in order to determine how a price-based royalty policy like DWRRA
affects the firm’s investment decisions. Due to the fact that the value of the lease
at earlier stages of investment depends on the (expected) value of the lease at later
stages of investment, I proceed in reverse chronological order in the discussion of op-
timal investment choices below – first analyzing development, then exploration, and
finally acquisition. Although I will not empirically examine the development phase, I
must solve for the value of a generic lease at this stage in order to derive expressions
for the value of the same lease at earlier stages.
2.3.3 Predictions with and without Price-based Royalty Policy
2.3.3.1 Development
Within this model, if the leaseholder reaches the development phase (at t = 3),
then the firm necessarily engaged in acquisition at t = 1 and then successful explo-
ration at t = 2. Therefore Q = q˜. From the application of (2.2), the value of the
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firm’s development problem is:
E[V ∗3 ] = [1− F (ε∗4)]
[
(1− τ)[(1− τ r)β(p3 + E[ε4|ε4 ≥ ε∗4])q˜ − kD]− ρ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected accounting profits conditional on accounting profits> 0
− βr˜[(1− τ)kD + ρ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
opportunity cost
(2.3)
where
ε∗4 ≡
ρ+ (1− τ)kD
β(1− τ)(1− τ r)q˜ − p3
is the period 4 price shock that would have to be realized to make accounting profit
at t=3 exactly 0. Furthermore, here and in the rest of this section, it is assumed that
the leaseholder observes the current price for the period before having to make the
invest or relinquish decision for that period. Note that if expression (2.3) is positive,
then the leaseholder should develop the lease.
The above expression is the value of the development problem in the absence of a
price-based royalty policy (with price thresholds above which the policy “turns off”),
the value of the firm’s development problem becomes
E[V ∗∗3 ] = [1− F (εˆ4)]
[
(1− τ)[(1− τ r)β(p3 + E[ε4|ε4 ≥ εˆ4])q˜ − kD]− ρ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected accounting profits conditional on accounting profits> 0, royalty
+ [F (εˆ4)− F (ε∗4)]
[
(1− τ)[β(p3 + E[ε4|εˆ4 ≥ ε4 ≥ ε∗4])q˜ − kD]− ρ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected accounting profits conditional on accounting profits> 0, no royalty
− βr˜[(1− τ)kD + ρ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
opportunity cost
(2.4)
where εˆ4 is such that p4 exactly equals the price threshold at t = 4, i.e. pˆ4 = p3 + εˆ4.
For any value of p4 > pˆ4, royalties will be owed on production.
16 If the price shock
16It is assumed that εˆ4 > ε∗4 is true.
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falls somewhere in (ε∗4, εˆ4), then royalties are waived. This outcome is reflected in
the “no royalty” term above, from which τ r is missing. Once again, the leaseholder
should develop the lease if (2.4) is positive.
The difference between (2.4) and (2.3) provides insight into how a royalty policy
like DWRRA affects a leaseholder’s development decision. Computing this difference
yields:
∆E[V ∗3 ] = [F (εˆ4)− F (ε∗4)]
[
τ r(1− τ)β(p3 + E[ε4|εˆ4 ≥ ε4 ≥ ε∗4])q˜
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected value of royalty payments saved
> 0.
Notice that the price at t = 4 must be high enough so that the investment is profitable
but not so high that the threshold is exceeded and royalty payments are therefore
owed. This simple model predicts more development due to the policy. Given that
∆E[V ∗3 ] is positive, the royalty policy increases the value of development thus making
it more likely that the investment rule for development is satisfied.
2.3.3.2 Exploration
At the exploration stage, the size of the deposit Q is unknown adding more un-
certainty to the firm’s problem, in addition to the fact that the price that will prevail
when production possibly occurs is now further into the future. Again applying (2.2),
the value of the firm’s exploration problem is:
E[V ∗2 ] =
[1− F2ε(e∗3)]
[
(1− τ)[(1− τ r)β2(p2 + E[e3|e3 ≥ e∗3])Rq˜ − βkD − kE]− (1 + β)ρ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected accounting profits conditional on accounting profits> 0
− βr˜[(1− τ)kE + ρ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
opportunity cost
(2.5)
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where e3 = ε3 + ε4 and
e∗3 ≡
(1 + β)ρ+ (1− τ)(βkD + kE)
β2(1− τ)(1− τ r)Rq˜ − p2
is the sum of period 3 and period 4 price shocks that would have to be realized to
make accounting profit at t=2 exactly 0. So, if expression (2.5) is positive, then the
leaseholder optimally explores.
Of course, interest lies in how the exploration decision is affected by the presence
of the price-based royalty policy. With such a policy in place, (2.5) becomes
E[V ∗∗2 ] =
[1− F2ε(eˆ3)]×[
(1− τ)[(1− τ r)β2(p2 + E[e3|e3 ≥ eˆ3])Rq˜ − βkD − kE]− (1 + β)ρ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected accounting profits conditional on accounting profits> 0, royalty
+
[F2ε(eˆ3)− F2ε(e∗3)]×[
(1− τ)[β2(p2 + E[e3|eˆ3 ≥ e3 ≥ e∗3])Rq˜ − βkD − kE]− (1 + β)ρ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected accounting profits conditional on accounting profits> 0, no royalty
− βr˜[(1− τ)kE + ρ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
opportunity cost
(2.6)
where eˆ3 is such that p4 exactly equals the price threshold at t = 4 given the current
price, p2, i.e. pˆ4 = p2 + eˆ3. Again, because the royalty waiver is contingent on the
price level at t = 4, given the current price, p2, the two realizations will determine
whether there are to be saved royalty payments or not from production. If the sum
of the two realized shocks is too large (i.e. e3 > eˆ3), then the policy is not in force
and royalties are owed.
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The difference between (2.6) and (2.5) is:
∆E[V ∗2 ] = [F2ε(eˆ3)− F2ε(e∗3)]
[
τ r(1− τ)β2(p2 + E[e3|eˆ3 ≥ e3 ≥ e∗3])Rq˜
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected value of royalty payments saved
> 0.
Given that the value of the exploration problem increases with the policy, it becomes
more likely that the investment rule will be satisfied. In other words: the model
predicts more exploration due to the price-based royalty policy.
2.3.3.3 Acquisition
The first stage of investment is simply the decision whether or not to purchase a
lease. Setting aside the price the firm would pay for a given lease (the bid conditional
on winning the auction for that lease), the value of the acquisition problem is:
E[V ∗1 ] =
[1− F3ε(e∗2)]×[
(1− τ)[(1− τ r)β3(p1 + E[e2|e2 ≥ e∗2])Rq˜ − β2kD − βkE]− (1 + β + β2)ρ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected accounting profits conditional on accounting profits> 0
− βr˜ρ︸︷︷︸
opportunity cost
(2.7)
where e2 = ε2 + ε3 + ε4 and
e∗2 ≡
(1 + β + β2)ρ+ β(1− τ)(βkD + kE)
β3(1− τ)(1− τ r)Rq˜ − p1
is the sum of the periods 2, 3, and 4 price shocks that would have to be realized to
make (expected) accounting profit at t=1 exactly 0.
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In the presence of the price-based royalty policy, (2.7) becomes
E[V ∗∗1 ] =
[1− F3ε(eˆ2)]×[
(1− τ)[(1− τ r)β3(p1 + E[e2|e3 ≥ eˆ2])Rq˜ − β2kD − βkE]− (1 + β + β2)ρ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected accounting profits conditional on accounting profits> 0, royalty
+
[F3ε(eˆ2)− F3ε(e∗2)]×[
(1− τ)[β3(p1 + E[e2|eˆ2 ≥ e2 ≥ e∗2])Rq˜ − β2kD − βkE]− (1 + β + β2)ρ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected accounting profits conditional on accounting profits> 0, no royalty
− βr˜ρ︸︷︷︸
opportunity cost
(2.8)
Notice that (2.8) is completely analogous to (2.4) and (2.6) and carries the same
implications already discussed for those expressions.
Finally, a comparison of (2.8) and (2.7) can be informative with regard to how a
policy like DWRRA will affect the acquisition decision. Taking their difference:
∆E[V ∗1 ] = [F3ε(eˆ2)− F3ε(e∗2)]
[
τ r(1− τ)β3(p1 + E[e2|eˆ2 ≥ e2 ≥ e∗2])Rq˜
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected value of royalty payments saved
> 0.
Not surprisingly, this expression is positive suggesting that all else equal, a given
block (a prospective lease) is worth more under the policy. Of course, this is subject
to greater uncertainty relative to ∆E[V ∗2 ] (vis-a`-vis price) and ∆E[V
∗
3 ] (vis-a`-vis both
price and quantity). Therefore, the model predicts more acquisition. Lastly, under the
assumption that the optimal bidding function is invariant to the policy and increasing
in the value of the block, the model also predicts higher bids.
A very rudimentary “simulation” of the above model for acquisition yields a value
of 0.0669 for ∆E[V ∗1 ]/E[V
∗
1 ], i.e. the presence of DWRRA increases the value of the
lease by roughly 6.69% (I computed this figure by selecting reasonable values for the
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model variables and then plugging these into both the expression for ∆E[V ∗1 ] and
(2.7)).17 Though this predicted percent change in lease value due to the policy will
be small compared to the percent bid effects in Table 2.6 (formally presented and
discussed in the Results section), if the optimal bid is a highly nonlinear function
of the expected value of the lease, then a small percent increase in the latter could
potentially yield a relatively larger percent increase in the former.
2.4 Empirical Analysis
This section of the paper is intended to bridge the gap between the theoreti-
cal model detailed in the previous section (which generates predictions regarding
DWRRA’s effects) and the empirical results presented in the next section (from which
conclusions about the policy’s actual effects are to be drawn).
2.4.1 Implementation of the Theoretical Model
The firm’s acquisition and exploration decisions are determined in general by
expressions (2.7) and (2.5), respectively. In both cases, the firm makes the investment
if expected economic profits (conditional on positive accounting profits) are positive.
Of course, economic profits is a latent variable never observed by the econometrician.
The following, however, is observable:
eit =
 1 if E[V
∗
2 ] > 0;
0 if E[V ∗2 ] ≤ 0.
17The set of “reasonable” values for the variables defined at the outset of this section are: r˜ = 0.05,
R = 0.1, q˜ = 350, 000, 000 barrels of oil, ke = $100, 000, 000, kd = $500, 000, 000, py = $35 (the
relevant price threshold value), with a current oil price of $25. Also, the price shock is normally-
distributed with mean 0 and variance 100. Lastly, τr = 1/6, τ = 0.35, and ρ = $43, 200 represent
the choices of policymakers. Finally, I ignore the role of the suspension volume entirely in this
simulation.
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It is clear from the previous section that the expected value of the lease is a function
of expectations over price and resource quantity among other variables. Under the
assumption that E[V ∗2 ] can be expressed as a linear function,
Pr[eit = 1|Xit] = Pr[E[V ∗2 ] > 0]
= Pr[X
′
itΘ + it > 0]
= G(X
′
itΘ),
where G, the CDF of it, is assumed symmetric about 0. A completely analogous
argument leads to an analogous estimating equation for the acquisition decision.
The linearity assumption for the expected value of the lease yields a general base-
line specification for the estimating equations:
yit|Xit = G(X′itΘ)
= G(α0 + α1t+ α2t
2 +X
′
itβ + γpt + δDWRRAi), (2.9)
where yit represents any one of the outcomes of interest (Pr[ait = 1], Pr[eit = 1], or
E[bit], where b is the winning bid) and G(X
′
itΘ) = Λ(X
′
itΘ) for acquisition and explo-
ration while G(X
′
itΘ) = X
′
itΘ for bidding. Furthermore, Xit = [t t
2 X
′
it pt DWRRAi]
is the vector of covariates and Θ = [α0 α1 α2 β
′
γ δ]
′
is the vector of parameters to
be estimated. The vector of covariates is comprised of t and t2, the current period
and the squared current period; Xit, a vector of characteristics for block/lease i at t;
pt, the price of oil at t; and DWRRAi, a dummy variable for whether block/lease i is
eligible for DWRRA. Note that the inclusion of t and t2 as covariates allows for con-
sistent estimation in the presence of some unobservable that is changing non-linearly
with time. This polynomial time trend is intended to correct for the influence of
(smooth) technological change – which was substantial during the sample period –
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and is expected to influence earlier stages of investment, e.g. acquisition, by lowering
costs. In some specifications, this time trend is permitted to vary by the block or
lease’s water depth category (i.e. 200-399m, 400-799m, etc.) because the technological
change disproportionately affects deeper blocks.
2.4.2 Data and Data Sources
Having briefly introduced the general specification, I now discuss the actual vari-
ables used in the estimating equations and argue for their inclusion given the theoret-
ical model constructed earlier. The source for nearly all of the data is the BOEMRE.
Subsequent to acquiring a federal lease, the leaseholder generally must submit a form
to the BOEMRE before engaging in any type of activity on that lease. The BOEMRE
is required by law to release much of the information contained within the submitted
forms without the consent of the lessee (30 CFR 250.197), and makes these data
publicly available on its website.18 The three most important BOEMRE data sets for
this analysis are called “Lease Data,” “Borehole,” and “Blocks.” The first of these,
“Lease Data,” is a lease-level data set that includes characteristics for each of the
over 25,000 leases issued in the Gulf of Mexico by the BOEMRE since the 1940s.
“Borehole” is a well-level data set containing well characteristics for all wells ever
drilled in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico. Important among these is the “spud date” (the
date on which drilling commences) and the self-reported type of well (exploratory or
development). This information is collected in Form BOEMRE-133, the Well Activ-
ity Report, and in Form BOEMRE-123S, the Supplemental Application for Permit
to Drill Information Sheet, respectively. Finally, “Blocks” contains latitude and lon-
gitude information for the corners of each block in the Gulf of Mexico, with which I
am able to determine each block’s set of neighbor blocks. Lastly, the daily one-month
futures price, alternately known as the daily “nearby delivery month” price (which
18http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/homepg/pubinfo/freeasci/freedesc.html.
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functions as the spot price) for oil and natural gas is collected from the New York
Mercantile Exchange by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). These
data are also downloadable.19
With these data, I am able to construct detailed profiles of characteristics for each
individual lease over time. Given the interest in estimating the impact of DWRRA on
various investment outcomes, I construct the lease histories for underlying variables
that relate to the determinants of lease value in the theoretical model – namely, the
quantity of the resource (Q), the price of the resource (p), and the costs that must
be incurred in order to produce (kE, kD). Of these, only price is observable, and so
it enters the general estimating equation, (4.6), directly. Of course, given time to
build and the fact that the firm cannot extract the deposit instantaneously once the
production capital is installed, the spot price that prevails when the firm makes its
investment choices will certainly not prevail over the potential period of production.
To the extent that oil and natural gas prices evolve as Markov processes, however,
the current spot price of oil contains all of the information relevant to constructing
expectations of future spot prices. In addition, the use of spot vis-a`-vis futures prices
is due to the fact that futures contracts for delivery more than two years in advance are
characterized by marked thinness, where two years is brief relative to the time needed
for offshore oil investment. With regard to costs of exploration and development, the
lease’s water depth (and depth2 to reflect a potential nonlinearity in the cost function)
enters (4.6) as a time-invariant element of Xit for bidding and exploration (it is not
available for unleased blocks and thus is not included in the acquisition specification).
The other components of Xit are all meant to reflect the firm’s beliefs about the
block or lease’s resource quantity, Q. A number of these variables are measures of
the block’s characteristics prior to the current lease, denoted as “Own” in Table 2.3,
for example. Though Q is not observable by the econometrician or the leaseholder,
19From website http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet pri fut s1 d.htm.
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for that matter (prior to exploration), the actions of previous leaseholders on the
block in question reveal information about their beliefs regarding Q. A potentially
important piece of information regarding an available block is whether or not is has
been leased before, which is indicated by the variable “Own: previously leased.” This
matters because if a block was previously leased, it is indicative of some degree of
optimism regarding its potential productivity. These microdata allow, however, allow
for further investigation. Again referencing Table 2.3, the symbol ↪→ indicates that
the term that follows it is true, as are all lines with that symbol above it, along with
the variable on the last line that preceded these variables with ↪→. Thus, for each
previously leased block or lease, I record whether it’s most recent lease term expired
(as opposed to the former lease being relinquished, which would indicate pessimism
regarding the lease’s possible profitability), whether the lease was itself explored,
and conditional on that, whether the leaseholder found hydrocarbons in economically
viable quantities (which the BOEMRE refers to as a “qualifying” lease). With the
practice of area-wide leasing, I create analogous variables for blocks that are newly
available (were leased during the last sale).
Given the often common geology of geographically proximate blocks, lease-specific
resource information about a given block j is informative with regard to the amount of
the resource on adjacent block i. Given the strategic importance and potential value
of pre-exploration lease-specific data, e.g. data from seismic surveys, these variables
are generally not observable and thus cannot enter the empirical model. Instead, I
employ variables measuring the actions of firms in response to these (unobservable)
variables on neighboring leases. These variables are denoted by the “Neighbors”
suffix in, for example, Table 2.3. For two blocks to be considered neighbors, their
respective centroids (geographic center of the block) must be within five miles of
one another. Regarding the “neighbor” variables, all are counts of the number of
neighboring blocks/leases for which the condition is true. The absence of the ∆ means
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that the variable counts the number of neighbor blocks for which the condition was
true at the time of interest (the lease offering for acquisition and bidding, some month
following the lease offering for exploration). The presence of the ∆ means that the
variable measures the change in the count between the current period of interest and
either the lease offering (for exploration estimation) in which the lease was purchased
or the lease offering that preceded that one (for acquisition estimation).
2.4.3 Estimation
The estimations of the acquisition, bidding, and exploration models are performed
on repeated observations for the same block/lease, meaning that the estimation is
pooled. For example, a given lease i will enter the log-likelihood function for explo-
ration for as many time periods as it is still leased but not yet drilled:
Pr[ei,tˆ+1 = 1|Xtˆ+1] = Λ(Xe
′
tˆ+1Θ)
Pr[ei,tˆ+2 = 1|Xtˆ+2,
tˆ+1∑
t=tˆ+1
eit = 0] = Λ(X
e′
tˆ+2Θ)
Pr[ei,tˆ+3 = 1|Xtˆ+3,
tˆ+2∑
t=tˆ+1
eit = 0] = Λ(X
e′
tˆ+3Θ)
...
Pr[ei,tˆ+T = 1|Xtˆ+T ,
tˆ+T−1∑
t=tˆ+1
eit = 0] = Λ(X
e′
tˆ+TΘ),
where t = tˆ represents the period of acquisition. The equations above represent
the case where lease i is never explored before the last period (exploration could
still possibly occur at t = tˆ + T ). Alternatively, if lease i was explored in period
t = tˆ+3, then the lease would have exited the exploration sample after three periods.
Finally, in the empirical models for each outcome, errors are clustered on the lease
or block identifier, i.e. the empirical model permits the errors to be correlated across
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observations within the same block or lease.
2.5 Results
The parameters estimates presented in this section are generated using samples of
deep water blocks and leases relating to the 34 CGM and WGM lease offerings held
during the years 1984-2000. The earliest of these, CGM Sale 81, was held on April
24, 1984 while the latest, WGM Sale 177, was held on August 28, 2000. The sample
corresponds approximately to the beginning of area-wide leasing and exactly to the
end of DWRRA.20 I have excluded blocks available and leases sold in lease offerings
held after 2000 because BOEMRE offered a modified (and less generous) version of
DWRRA for leases sold in those auctions.
2.5.1 Acquisition
Table 2.3 provides descriptive statistics for the covariates in the acquisition model
for the relevant sample. The sample is comprised of all deep water blocks available in
at least one lease offering for the CGM or WGM planning areas during the years 1984-
2000. This is an unbalanced panel comprised of 9,054 individual blocks and 124,564
block-years (“-years” is appropriate because there is one sale per planning area per
year). It is characterized by attrition (once a block is sold, it leaves the panel), late
entry (if a block was leased at the time of the 1984 lease offering but then expired or
was relinquished prior to the year 2000 lease offering), and re-entry (if a block was
acquired at the 1984 lease offering or later but then expired or was relinquished prior
to the year 2000 lease offering). Therefore, the panel is only balanced for the 4,360
blocks that were available in the 1984 lease offerings and then never subsequently
20BOEMRE commenced area-wide leasing with CGM Sale 72 held on May 25, 1983, but I exclude
this lease offering from the sample, along with WGM Sale 74 held on August 24, 1983, because I have
not found reliable data regarding which blocks were made available in the last sales preceding the
advent of area-wide leasing, information that is necessary for constructing many of the covariates.
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sold through the year 2000 lease offerings. These unleased block-years number 74,120
(approximately 59.5% of the sample). Finally, of the 124,564 block auctions held
during this period, only 6,140 (4.93%) resulted in the sale of the block.
Figure 2.6 suggests an effect on the acquisition of deep water blocks due to
DWRRA. The pooled probability of acquisition both before (for lease offerings held
during 1984-1995) and during DWRRA (for lease offerings held during 1996-2000)
are presented as dashed lines at 0.0291 and 0.1121, respectively. Although the differ-
ence of 0.083 in unconditional probabilities hints at an effect of the policy, it however
masks variation in the probability of acquisition both before and during the policy.
For example, after the first three years that DWRRA is in force, the probability of
acquisition drops to the level in 1995, the last year prior to the policy being applied.
Table 2.4 lists estimated average marginal effects and finite differences for the
baseline empirical model for the acquisition decision. Note that for this model, I have
added one additional macro-level variable to specification (4.6) in order to reflect
the general climate for investment. The variable, the proportional “output gap”
represents the percent difference between predicted and actual GDP.21 Inclusion of
this variable is justified on the grounds that a weaker economy (signified by a larger
output gap) would bode poorly for the profitability of future offshore oil projects,
which necessarily begin with leasing.
Results are reported in Table 2.4 for three different specifications, which differ
in how they handle the trending unobservable – not at all in column (1); using a
polynomial time trend in column (2); and using three, one for each depth category,
polynomial time trends in column (3). Both a comparison between the estimated
finite differences in acquisition due to DWRRA and the difference in unconditional
probability of acquisition along with an examination of the estimated coefficients for
21The actual variable equals (predicted GDP - GDP)/(predicted GDP) where “predicted GDP”
is estimated on a quarterly basis by the Congressional Budget Office and GDP is computed by the
Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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the polynomial trends point to the specification in column (1) as being preferred.
First, the estimated finite difference in column (1) is 0.074 (i.e. the presence of
DWRRA increases the probability of lease acquisition by 7.4 percentage points),
which is much more in line with the observed difference of 0.083. In contrast, the
models with time trends predict effects of the policy nearly three time larger than
the difference in unconditional probabilities. Second, for all quadratic time trends
estimated in column (2) and column (3), the linear term has a positive coefficient
while the squared term has a negative coefficient. This implies that as time passes,
the effect of the changing unobservable (i.e. technology) is attenuating and then
eventually becoming increasingly negative. These estimated effects are not intuitively
consistent with the improved technology that occurred in offshore exploration and
production during the sample period.
Given the above discussion, I focus on the estimates in column (1). The empirical
model is meant to approximate the theoretical model in that the potential leaseholder
makes the choice to acquire the lease (or not) based on the most current informa-
tion available to it regarding future resource price and quantity. Observable (to the
econometrician) information about resource quantity is derived from the block’s own
history (the “Own” variables, which are true at the time of purchase and unchanging
after) and from outcomes on neighboring leases (the “Neighbor” variables, which can
vary after the lease is purchased). Regarding the latter group of variables, “# leased”
is less an outcome, but rather reflects the possibility for the receipt of additional in-
formation from new drilling outcomes. Finally, conditional on the prospective block
being available in the previous lease offering, the “Neighbors: ∆ . . . ” variables reflect
the change in the stock of information from the set of neighboring blocks since that
last lease offering. In the presence of these determinants of potential lease value as
suggested by theoretical model, the DWRRA eligibility indicator is meant to quantify
the change in the probability of acquisition controlling for their effects.
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Regarding the acquisition decision, newly available blocks (due to expiration of the
previous lease) that were unexplored are attractive prospects, though similar explored
blocks that were not “qualifying” are not (see section 2.1 for discussion of qualifying
leases). Intuitively, both blocks were deemed valuable enough to purchase, sending
a positive signal to the potential buyer, but then the non-qualifying explored block
was revealed to be of lower quality in the exploration outcome. In the broader set of
previously held blocks that are not newly available, previously relinquished blocks are
also attractive purchases (this seems counterintuitive, but might have more to do with
blocks from just-expired leases being repurchased immediately). Finally, changes and
the prospect of changes in information on neighboring blocks also positively influence
lease purchase. Controlling for the observables included in the model, the mean
estimated marginal effect on the probability of acquisition for a block being sold while
DWRRA was in force is 7.4 percentage points. Thus, consistent with the theoretical
prediction, the prospect of royalty liability being waived makes it more likely that a
given block will be purchased.
2.5.2 Bidding
Table 2.5 provides descriptive statistics for the covariates in the bidding model
for the relevant sample. The sample is comprised of all deep water leases sold in
any CGM or WGM planning area lease offerings held during the years 1984-2000.22
There are 6,140 such leases, of which 3,401 were sold while DWRRA was in force
(1996-2000). This collection of covariates is almost identical to those used in the
acquisition specification, except I now include the lease’s water depth (in 1000s of
feet) and squared water depth and omit the output gap.
Figure 2.7 attempts to establish suggestive evidence of an effects on bids of the
22By “sold,” I mean that the high bid was not rejected and winning bidder actually chose to “take
delivery of” the issued lease. Though rare, winning bidders can decide not to take the lease for
which they submitted an accepted bid.
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policy change. This is complicated somewhat by the fact the reserve bids vary over
the sample period (see Figure 2.2). While I easily control for this in estimating the
regressions, I deal with variable reserve bids here but by presenting mean values for
the bid minus the reserve bid, by year. A further complication arises in that the
mean bid for the period prior to DWRRA is highly dependent on the years included.
Noting that the dotted lines in Figure 2.7 represent the pooled mean bid (in 2009 $)
both before and during DWRRA, inclusion of years 1984-1986 in the pre-DWRRA
group (which already includes 1987-1995) changes the treatment effect as estimated
by the difference in pooled mean bids from $576,496 to -$35,196 (a 95.5% increase
to a 2.9% decrease). This is equivalent to moving from the lower to upper panel of
Figure 2.7 (recall that the estimation sample used for the regressions is comprised of
all deep water leases sold in all years 1984-2000).
Table 2.6 lists estimated average marginal effects and finite difference for the
baseline empirical model for the bidding decision. The differences between the three
columns is analogous to the difference in the Table 2.4; in addition all specifications
include dummies for the posted per-acre reserve bid, which differed between lease
offerings in the sample (see Figure 2.2). The empirical bidding model is meant to
estimate the effects of observable (to the econometrician) lease characteristics at the
time of sale on the winning bid paid for the lease. The entries in 2.6 are semi-
elasticities as the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the winning bid in
2009 dollars. Focusing on specification (3), the possibility of royalty relief increases
the winning bid by approximately 60%. This is consistent with both the model and
our intuition, as the lease is more valuable in expectation (given certain realizations
of price), so bidders pay more for it.
Quantifying the policy change’s treatment effect on the winning bid is complicated
by fact that acquisition is also affected by DWRRA. We would expect the estimated
effect to be less than the true effect as the flood of marginal leases pulls down the
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average bid (recall the relatively large estimated effect of DWRRA on acquisition). A
rather coarse way of dealing with this is to assume that the leases receiving the highest
bid are the most inframarginal, and then estimate the effects using quantile regression
at various quantiles. These results are shown in Figure 2.8: the semi-elasticity for
DWRRA is (almost) monotonically increasing through the quantiles and surpasses
the estimated OLS semi-elasticity at approximately the 55th quantile.
2.5.3 Exploration
Table 2.7 provides descriptive statistics for the data used to estimate the empirical
exploration model. The unit of analysis is the lease-month, with the earliest lease-
month corresponding to June 1984 (the earliest date for which any lease purchased
at CGM Sale 81 became effective) and the latest lease-month corresponding to June
2010. A lease, specifically a deep water lease sold anytime during the period 1984-
2000, enters the sample as soon at it is purchased and exits the sample when an
exploratory well is drilled or when it is no longer possible for the leaseholder to drill
an exploratory well (i.e. when the lease expires or is relinquished). The first variable
in 2.7, “Drilled,” is the dependent variable in the subsequent logit regressions and it
indicates whether an at-risk lease has an exploratory well drilled (for the first ever) in
the current month. Of the 6,140 leases in the sample, 133 (2.16%) are right-censored.
Finally, the average time at risk (measured in months) in the sample for leases with
five-year and ten-year lease terms is 55.6 and 97.9 months, respectively.
Table 2.2 compares the number of leases acquired and explored by depth zone
and DWRRA status. The strong influence of the change in royalty treatment on
the acquisition decision is clear for the ≥ 800m category (which accounts for over
75% of acquired leases): the average number of leases sold per lease offering jumps
from 72.2 to 291.4 with the advent of DWRRA. Continuing to focus on the ≥ 800m
category, despite the fact that the number of leases that ever has an exploratory
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well increases with the change in royalty treatment, the probability of an exploratory
well conditional on royalty treatment falls from 0.116 to 0.072. With the increase in
the numerator of the probability, the sharp drop in the probability of the lease being
explored is due to the strong acquisition effect. In this way, the large acquisition effect
causes the influence of DWRRA (and its more favorable royalty terms) to appear to
negatively affect subsequent investment if the investment measure is conditioned on
acquisition.
The influence of the large acquisition effect is also clear from the estimates in
2.8. I focus on specification (1) which includes variables representing the stock of
aggregate information about neighbor blocks/leases at the time the lease of interest
is sold, and also measures of how those information stocks have changed up to the
current month. Furthermore, the influence of neighbor information is allowed to vary
depending on whether neighboring leases have their vintages during the DWWRA
period, 1996-2000, or not (I allow for differential effects because the more favorable
royalty treatment of DWRRA lowers the threshold for acquisition, exploration, etc.
and thus these actions need not carry the same information as they would for pre-
DWRRA leases). Estimated coefficients for the neighbor variable stocks are provided
in the second panel of Table 2.8. Turning to the first panel of Table 2.8 (which
includes coefficients for all variables related to the lease-month, itself, and prices),
the mean marginal effect of DWRRA eligibility (summing the mean marginal effects
for both “DWRRA Eligible” and “DWRRA Eligible × Spot Price” where the latter
is computed following Ai and Norton (2003)) on the per-month drilling hazard is
-0.00019. The interaction term is included because of the price thresholds that are a
part of DWRRA: recall that royalty liability is reinstated if the average oil or natural
gas in the calendar year exceeds a threshold. Therefore, we expect that at high prices,
any effect of DWRRA on the drilling hazard will become more negative (as DWRRA
eligible leases becomes less valuable relative to non-DWRRA leases with the price
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increase). Although the estimated mean marginal effect of DWRRA eligibility is
absolutely small, the probability of an exploratory well being drilled in a given month
is also a very small number (recall from Table 2.7 that the unconditional hazard is
0.0013) and thus this treatment effect can be considered relatively large.
While the above estimate is informative, the dependence on acquisition stymies
estimation of any effect that carries implications for efficiency (e.g. we do not believe
that a lower royalty will lead to less investment, all else equal). In order to get
an estimate that reflects the change in exploratory drilling that, though technically
conditional on acquisition, is unaffected by the amount of acquisition that precedes
it, I abandon the probability of exploratory drilling in favor of a count: the number
of leases drilled. Table 2.2 provides suggestive evidence that DWRRA increased the
occurrence of exploratory drilling. In order to get a causative effect of the change in
royalty status on exploratory drilling, I propose the following estimator:
%∆E[Ne]
∆D
=
[
1 +
%∆Na
∆D
][
1 +
%∆F (T )
∆D
]
− 1, (2.10)
which is derived and made operational in Appendix B. In (2.10), Ne is the number
of explored leases, Na is the number of acquired leases, and “D” is shorthand for
DWRRA status. Plugging in estimates already discussed yields:
̂(%∆E[Ne]
∆D
)
= (1 + 1.89)(1− 0.1458)− 1 = 1.504,
meaning that the expected number of exploratory wells is estimated to increase by
150% due to removal of the royalty.
2.5.4 Some Closing Remarks
Although the price of oil looms large in the model and intuitively is an impor-
tant determinant of investment, its estimated coefficients are quantitatively small or
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statistically insignificant in the empirical models for acquisition, bidding, and explo-
ration. At the same time, the coefficient estimates for the DWRRA indicator imply
that this policy affects these investment decisions, this despite the fact that DWRRA
superficially resembles a price change, as it changes the percentage royalty assessed on
revenue. A possible explanation for this lies in the fact that oil is produced from many
different geographic sources, but DWRRA is applied in nonuniform way across these
sources. Specifically, DWRRA favors oil investment and production opportunities in
the deep waters of the U.S. Gulf of Mexico only, while a price increase, for instance,
affects all opportunities in approximately the same positive manner. Thus, DWRRA
made investment in deep water prospects in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico differentially
more attractive in a way that an equivalent price increase could not.
Finally, recall that the empirical model of exploration relies heavily on variables
measuring activity on neighboring leases. An important finding in the public finance
literature is that neighboring (broadly defined) political jurisdictions’ (U.S. states, in
the research in question) expenditures are correlated even after controlling for observ-
able and unobservable own and neighbor characteristics (Case et al. (1993)). To the
extent that hydrocarbon leases resemble political jurisdictions in arguably important
ways, then the estimated effect of DWRRA on exploration might be inconsistent in
that it will absorb the “natural” effect of neighbor’s activities on one another that
prevails whether the policy is in force or not. To completely address this concern
would require an instrument, where unfortunately none is available.
2.6 Conclusion
Using administrative data compiled by the U.S. Department of Interior from leases
in the Gulf of Mexico, this paper estimates the effects of a potential royalty suspension
on the acquisition, exploration, and bidding behavior of firms. Exploiting variation in
the royalty rate provided by the Deep Water Royalty Relief Act (DWRRA), I show
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that a temporary suspension of royalty liability increases the probability of block
acquisition by an average of 193%, lowers the probability that a lease is ever drilled
during its term by 14.5%, and increases the expected number of leases explored by
150%. In addition, the average winning bid paid for a lease increases by 60%. The
favored interpretation is that these estimates, taken together, imply that firms greatly
expanded their lease holdings in response to the lower potential royalty. With only a
finite set of potential leases in the Gulf of Mexico, however, these new (and marginal)
holdings were of lower quality, on average, than those sold prior to DWRRA, and
therefore less likely to be drilled. That the leases sold with DWRRA vintages have a
lower probability of drilling is borne out in the data. The combination of estimated
values suggests that firms reacted to the prospect of lessened royalty liability by
engaging in much more speculative investment at the acquisition stage, but also by
increasing the absolute number of leases in which they invested in subsequent phases.
Page 42 of the document “Oil and Gas Leasing Procedures Guidelines” includes
the following passage: “In administering the offshore oil and gas leasing program, the
Secretary of the Interior is required by law to see that the Government receives a fair
return for the lease rights granted and the minerals conveyed” (Minerals Management
Service (2001)). Most citizens and policymakers would likely agree with this state-
ment – that private sector firms should pay something for the right to profit from
resources extracted from parcels of publicly-owned land, which technically belong to
the citizenry – but would be unprepared to answer what is the “best” way to accom-
plish such rent sharing from the standpoint of administrative simplicity, efficiency, etc.
The challenge in comparatively evaluating different frameworks for rent capture has
much to do with the lack of estimates for firm responses to different royalty rates, for
example. Although the particular form of DWRRA precludes an empirical analysis to
match the theoretical evaluation of leasing policy offered in Leland (1978), this paper
estimates quantitatively large responses in drilling and bidding to the prospect of a
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lower royalty rate. Together these suggest that a movement away from the royalty
might improve efficiency without necessarily sacrificing revenue.
2.7 Appendix: The Deep Water Royalty Relief Act
On November 28, 1995, President Bill Clinton signed Public Law 104-58, which
included three sections - 302, 303, and 304 - which together comprised the substantive
portions of the Outer Continental Shelf Deep Water Royalty Relief Act (DWRRA).23
These sections constituted amendments to section 8 of the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act (OCSLA), 43 U.S.C. 1337. Section 302 clarifies the authority of the Sec-
retary of the Interior to reduce or eliminate royalties on current or future production
from existing leases (at the time of DWRRA’s enactment), whether producing or
not-yet-producing, for the sake of encouraging extraction. Section 302 also provides
that new production from existing leases (at the time of DWRRA’s enactment) on
blocks at water depths greater than 200m could qualify for royalty suspension if, fol-
lowing application by the leaseholder, the Secretary of the Interior determined that
production was sufficiently marginal that it would not occur without the removal of
royalty liability. This section also states that continued royalty relief at a point in
time is conditioned on the total quantity of oil or natural gas cumulatively extracted
and the average price of the resource during that calendar year. Section 303 puts
forth a new bidding system mandating that the Secretary of the Interior offers new
blocks with royalty suspensions under stipulations to be determined by the Secretary.
Finally, section 304 requires that all blocks in waters greater than 200m deep that are
offered during the five-year period beginning with the enactment of DWRRA be sold
under the bidding system laid out in section 303. Furthermore, it specifies minimum
suspension volumes (the maximum amount of royalty-free production that can be
produced from the unit to which it is applied). All of these provisions applied only to
23Davis and Neff (1996) provides a thorough account of the legislative history of DWRRA.
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blocks lying west of 87 degrees, 30 minutes West longitude (in either the Central Gulf
of Mexico planning area or the Western Gulf of Mexico planning area, effectively).
The vagueness of the DWRRA provisions of Public Law 104-58 necessitated the
release of subsequent rules so that the act could be implemented in the first sale to
which it was meant to apply: lease offering 157 on April 24, 1996. A Final Rule
issued on February 2, 1996 clarified section 303 (61 FR 3800). Specifically, it further
amended OCSLA so that royalty liability could be contingent on the price level of oil
or natural gas and so that the conditions under which royalties would be owed could
be stipulated in the final notice of sale (FNOS). An Interim Rule issued on March 25,
1996 clarified that suspension volumes (defined in subsection 4.1 above) for new leases
would be applied to the field rather than to the individual lease and also specified
which new leases would be eligible for royalty relief (61 FR 12022). These eligibility
criteria, along with specific oil and natural gas price thresholds above which royalty
liability would be in force, were printed in the FNOS for lease offering 157.
2.8 Appendix: Derivation of Estimator for E[Ne]
The expected number of explored leases through t periods, N et , can be expressed
as
E[N et ] = N
aF (t)
where Na is the number of acquired leases and F (t) is the CDF for te, the period
when exploratory drilling occurs. Letting D be a dummy variable indicating DWRRA
eligibility, then the marginal effect of DWRRA on E[Ne] is
∆E[Ne]
∆D
=
[
Na +
∆Na
∆D
][
F (T ) +
∆F (T )
∆D
]
−NaF (T ). (2.11)
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Note that (2.11) can be converted to a semi-elasticity by dividing both sides by
NaF (T ):
1
NaF (T )
· ∆E[Ne]
∆D
=
1
Na
[
Na +
∆Na
∆D
]
1
F (T )
[
F (T ) +
∆F (T )
∆D
]
− 1
↔ (∆E[Ne]/E[Ne])
∆D
=
[
1 +
(∆Na/Na)
∆D
][
1 +
(∆F (T )/F (T ))
∆D
]
− 1
↔ %∆E[Ne]
∆D
=
[
1 +
%∆Na
∆D
][
1 +
%∆F (T )
∆D
]
− 1.
The final line of the derivation reveals that the semi-elasticity of the expected num-
ber of explored leases is a function of two other semi-elasticities: for the number of
leases acquired and for the CDF for the time of first exploratory well. In order to
operationalize this expression, we require estimates for the two semi-elasticities that
compose it. These are discussed in turn below.
Having defined te as the period when exploratory drilling occurs, let ta represent
the period when lease acquisition occurs. The discrete-time hazard for exploratory
drilling is defined as
λ(t) ≡ Pr[te = t|te ≥ t];
in words: the probability that exploratory drilling occurs at t given that it has not
occurred prior to t. Note that the discrete-time survivor function for drilling can be
expressed as
S(t) = Pr[te ≥ t] =
t−1∏
s=ta+1
(1− λ(s)).
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Given the identity S(t) + F (t) = 1, we have
F (t) = Pr[te < t] = 1−
t−1∏
s=ta+1
(1− λ(s)),
which is the CDF for te. Defining T as either
1. the period during which drilling occurs, conditional on it having occurred; or
2. the last period during which drilling can occur, conditional on it not having
occurred; or
3. the last observed period during which drilling is possible, conditional on it not
having occurred (applies to leases for which the lease term is right-censored),
and evaluating the CDF at this point in time, yields
F (T ) = 1−
T−1∏
s=ta+1
(1− λ(s)).
This is the probability that a lease is ever drilled during its (observed) lifetime.
The semi-elasticity of DWRRA for the probability that a lease is ever drilled can
be expressed in terms of the marginal effect of DWRRA on the hazard in the following
way:
%∆F (T )
∆D
=
(∆F (T )/F (T ))
∆D
=
[
1−∏T−1s=ta+1(1− [λ(s) + ∆λ(s)∆D ])]− [1−∏T−1s=ta+1(1− λ(s))]
1−∏T−1s=ta+1(1− λ(s))
=
[
1−∏T−1s=ta+1(1− λ(s)− ∆λ(s)∆D ])
1−∏T−1s=ta+1(1− λ(s))
]
− 1.
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The estimator for this semi-elasticity is
̂(%∆F (T )
∆D
)
=
Na∑
i=1
([
1−∏Ti−1s=tai +1(1− λˆi(s)− ∆λi(s)∆D )
1−∏Ti−1s=tai +1(1− λˆi(s))
]
− 1
)
, (2.12)
where
λˆi(t) = Pˆr[t
e
i = t|tei ≥ t;Xit] = Λ(X
′
itβˆ)
from the empirical model for exploratory drilling.
Estimates for components of the average treatment effect of DWRRA eligibility
on the hazard for exploratory drilling, E
[
∆λ
∆D
]
, are provided in Table 2.8. The “total”
effect of DWRRA eligibility on the hazard is the sum of the “direct” effect reported
for “DWRRA eligible” and the interaction effect for “DWRRA eligible × Spot Price”
reported in Table 2.8. With the presence of the interaction with the spot price of
oil, the ATE is determined by the unreported estimated coefficients for “DWRRA
eligible,” “DWRRA eligible × Spot Price,” and “Spot Price - Oil,” along with the
actual data, itself (Ai and Norton (2003)).
Turning now to the estimate for %∆Na
∆D
, note that effect of DWRRA status on the
probability of acquisition (if not the number of acquired blocks) is provided in Table
2.4. Letting Pr[ait = 1|D] represent the probability of block acquisition conditional
only on DWRRA status, note that this probability is directly observable. This figure
is an input to the semi-elasticity estimator:
̂(%∆Na
∆D
)
=
(
∆Pr[ait=1|Xit]
∆D
)
Pr[ait = 1|D = 0] . (2.13)
Insertion of (2.12) and (2.13) in (2.10) allow for ready estimation of the percentage
change in the expected number of explored leases.
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Figure 2.1: Area (upper) and block (lower) maps for CGM and WGM.
43
Figure 2.2: Reserve bids for CGM lease offerings, 1983-2008.
Figure 2.3: Annual rent for CGM lease offerings, 1983-2008.
44
Figure 2.4: Oil prices, 1996-2009.
Figure 2.5: Natural gas prices, 1996-2009.
45
Figure 2.6: Acquisition of deep water leases, 1984-2000.
46
Figure 2.7: Bidding for deep water leases, 1984-2000.
47
Figure 2.8: Quantile regression semi-elasticity estimates for DWRRA indicator.
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Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum
Leased 0.049 0.216 0.0 1
DWRRA Eligible 0.244 0.429 0 1
Spot Price - Oil 20.76 4.94 12.65 30.89
Proportional Output Gap 0.373 1.52 -3.38 3.09
Own: newly available 0.019 0.136 0 1
↪→ expired 0.012 0.111 0 1
↪→ explored 0.002 0.046 0 1
↪→ qualified 0.001 0.025 0 1
Own: previously leased 0.066 0.248 0 1
↪→ expired 0.038 0.192 0 1
↪→ explored 0.009 0.093 0 1
↪→ qualified 0.002 0.045 0 1
Neighbors: # leased 0.754 1.521 0 10
Neighbors: # explored 0.169 0.710 0 10
Neighbors: # qualified 0.044 0.306 0 7
Neighbors: # producing 0.024 0.238 0 6
Neighbors: ∆ # leased 0.112 0.687 -7 8
Neighbors: ∆ # explored 0.010 0.110 0 4
Neighbors: ∆ # qualified 0.005 0.073 0 3
Neighbors: ∆ # producing 0.002 0.052 0 3
N 124,564
Table 2.3: Acquisition – descriptive statistics.
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Dependent Variable: Leased – block i sold in period t auction.
(1) (2) (3)
DWRRA Eligible 0.074∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗
(27.04) (25.57) (25.51)
Spot Price - Oil -0.0004∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.0001
(-3.88) (0.56) (0.42)
Proportional Output Gap -0.005∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗
(-12.54) (-6.00) (-6.01)
Own: newly available -0.01 -0.003 -0.004
(-1.94) (-0.52) (-0.79)
↪→ expired 0.081∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗
(4.95) (4.32) (4.08)
↪→ explored -0.025∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗
(-4.45) (-5.77) (-5.32)
↪→ qualified -0.009 -0.01 -0.008
(-0.56) (-0.69) (-0.53)
Own: previously leased 0.067∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗
(10.97) (10.97) (11.17)
↪→ expired -0.007∗ -0.004 -0.001
(-1.97) (-1.03) (-0.17)
↪→ explored 0.004 0.001 -0.004
(0.57) (0.16) (-0.61)
↪→ qualified 0.035∗ 0.044∗ 0.041∗
(1.97) (2.12) (2.20)
Neighbors: # leased 0.008∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(19.85) (24.42) (23.15)
Neighbors: # explored -0.0002 -0.001 0.0004
(-0.17) (-0.82) (0.35)
Neighbors: # qualified 0.006∗ 0.002 -0.002
(2.01) (0.53) (-0.74)
Neighbors: # producing -0.013∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗ -0.003
(-4.15) (-3.03) (-1.11)
Neighbors: ∆ # leased 0.008∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(10.69) (6.75) (7.17)
Neighbors: ∆ # explored 0.030∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
(8.19) (7.35) (6.61)
Neighbors: ∆ # qualified 0.021∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
(3.52) (3.68) (4.20)
Neighbors: ∆ # producing -0.004 -0.008 -0.011
(-0.47) (-0.89) (-1.28)
Polynomial time trend No Yes No
Polynomial time trends (by depth) No No Yes
N 124,564 124,564 124,564
Pseudo R2 0.1320 0.1512 0.1548
Cluster-robust z statistics in parentheses (clustered on block).
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2.4: Acquisition – logit model marginal effect estimates.
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Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum
Winning bid (2009 $) 1,416,716 2,964,280 217 59,200,000
ln[Winning bid (2009 $)] 13.41 1.07 5.38 17.20
DWRRA Eligible 0.554 0.497 0 1
Spot Price - Oil 20.63 4.59 12.65 30.89
Lease water depth (1000s ft.) 4.604 2.435 0.578 11.159
(Lease water depth)2 27.13 25.05 0.334 124.52
Own: newly available 0.092 0.289 0 1
↪→ expired 0.078 0.268 0 1
↪→ explored 0.009 0.093 0 1
↪→ qualified 0.003 0.058 0 1
Own: previously leased 0.268 0.443 0 1
↪→ expired 0.177 0.382 0 1
↪→ explored 0.035 0.183 0 1
↪→ qualified 0.011 0.104 0 1
Neighbors: # leased 2.058 2.116 0 9
Neighbors: # explored 0.571 1.258 0 10
Neighbors: # qualified 0.163 0.573 0 6
Neighbors: # producing 0.078 0.418 0 6
Neighbors: ∆ # leased 0.447 1.181 -6 8
Neighbors: ∆ # explored 0.050 0.248 0 4
Neighbors: ∆ # qualified 0.025 0.177 0 3
Neighbors: ∆ # producing 0.007 0.096 0 2
N 6,140
Table 2.5: Bidding – descriptive statistics.
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Dependent Variable: ln[winning bid (2009 $)].
(1) (2) (3)
DWRRA Eligible 0.206∗∗∗ 0.657∗∗∗ 0.603∗∗∗
(7.50) (12.07) (11.05)
Spot Price - Oil -0.007∗ -0.009∗∗ -0.006
(-1.97) (-2.80) (-1.93)
Lease water depth 0.066∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗
(2.72) (3.69) (4.63)
(Lease water depth)2 -0.007∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗
(-3.32) (-4.26) (-5.26)
Own: newly available 0.258∗ 0.248∗ 0.265∗
(2.38) (2.36) (2.56)
↪→ expired 0.162 0.144 0.094
(1.22) (1.12) (0.74)
↪→ explored -0.341 -0.383 -0.388
(-1.43) (-1.63) (-1.70)
↪→ qualified 0.105 0.099 0.152
(0.29) (0.28) (0.45)
Own: previously leased 0.129∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗
(2.95) (5.14) (5.26)
↪→ expired 0.171∗ 0.200∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗
(2.53) (3.03) (3.60)
↪→ explored 0.104 0.086 0.065
(0.94) (0.78) (0.59)
↪→ qualified 0.127 0.172 0.156
(0.70) (0.97) (0.91)
Neighbors: # leased 0.033∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(4.09) (5.57) (5.62)
Neighbors: # explored -0.017 -0.006 0.002
(-0.86) (-0.30) (0.10)
Neighbors: # qualified 0.097 0.054 0.020
(1.86) (1.06) (0.39)
Neighbors: # producing -0.148∗ -0.145∗ -0.080
(-2.45) (-2.48) (-1.32)
Neighbors: ∆ # leased 0.023 0.007 0.007
(1.89) (0.55) (0.57)
Neighbors: ∆ # explored 0.108∗ 0.091 0.067
(2.10) (1.76) (1.32)
Neighbors: ∆ # qualified 0.068 0.080 0.118
(0.70) (0.83) (1.30)
Neighbors: ∆ # producing 0.006 0.025 -0.047
(0.04) (0.18) (-0.33)
Polynomial time trend No Yes No
Polynomial time trends (by depth) No No Yes
Reserve bid dummies Yes Yes Yes
N 6,140 6,140 6,140
R2 0.321 0.346 0.353
Cluster-robust t statistics in parentheses (clustered on lease).
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2.6: Bidding – coefficient estimates (estimates for constant term unreported).
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Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum
Drilled 0.0013 0.036 0 1
DWRRA Eligible 0.585 0.493 0 1
DWRRA Eligible × Spot Price 20.21 22.57 0 134.60
Lease water depth (1000s ft.) 4.99 2.27 0.578 11.159
(Lease water depth)2 30.09 24.21 0.334 124.52
First year of lease 0.136 0.343 0 1
Last year of lease 0.113 0.317 0 1
Spot Price - Oil 28.98 16.81 11.24 134.60
Spot Price - Oil (at auction) 20.59 4.45 12.65 30.89
Own: newly available 0.078 0.2668 0 1
↪→ expired 0.065 0.246 0 1
↪→ explored 0.007 0.080 0 1
↪→ qualified 0.003 0.052 0 1
Own: previously leased 0.231 0.422 0 1
↪→ expired 0.138 0.345 0 1
↪→ explored 0.024 0.154 0 1
↪→ qualified 0.009 0.093 0 1
Neighbors: # leased 5.25 1.927 0 10
Neighbors: # explored 0.693 1.307 0 10
Neighbors: # qualified 0.316 0.842 0 8
Neighbors: # producing 0.132 0.584 0 8
Neighbors: ∆ # leased 0.861 1.909 -8 8
Neighbors: ∆ # explored 0.268 0.639 0 6
Neighbors: ∆ # qualified 0.127 0.460 0 6
Neighbors: ∆ # producing 0.073 0.392 0 7
Neighbors: # leased (DWRRA) 2.847 2.631 0 9
Neighbors: # explored (DWRRA) 0.175 0.515 0 6
Neighbors: # qualified (DWRRA) 0.052 0.267 0 4
Neighbors: # producing (DWRRA) 0.016 0.149 0 3
Neighbors: ∆ # leased (DWRRA) 0.667 1.607 -8 8
Neighbors: ∆ # explored (DWRRA) 0.118 0.431 -3 5
Neighbors: ∆ # qualified (DWRRA) 0.037 0.234 -2 4
Neighbors: ∆ # producing (DWRRA) 0.015 0.147 -1 3
N 538,003
Table 2.7: Exploration – descriptive statistics.
55
Dependent Variable: Drilled – lease i drilled in month t.
(1) (2) (3)
DWRRA Eligible -0.0009∗∗ -0.0004 -0.0002
(-3.34) (-1.16) (-0.63)
DWRRA Eligible × Spot Price 0.00001 0.000006 0.000001
(1.40) (0.70) (0.05)
Lease water depth -0.0003∗∗∗ -0.0003∗∗ -0.0004∗∗∗
(-3.83) (-3.10) (-3.57)
(Lease water depth)2 0.00002∗ 0.00002 0.00002∗
(2.05) (1.67) (2.24)
First year of lease 0.00009 0.0003 0.0003
(0.53) (1.72) (1.73)
Last year of lease 0.0019∗∗∗ 0.0016∗∗∗ 0.0016∗∗∗
(7.68) (6.82) (6.78)
Spot Price - Oil -0.00002 -0.00001 -0.00001
(-1.25) (-1.01) (-0.96)
Spot Price - Oil (at auction) 0.00005∗∗∗ 0.00004∗∗ 0.00004∗∗
(3.55) (2.67) (2.65)
Own: newly available 0.00003 0.00005 -0.00002
(0.06) (0.11) (-0.05)
↪→ expired 0.0008 0.0007 0.0008
(1.01) (0.92) (0.99)
↪→ explored -0.0004 -0.0007∗ -0.0007∗
(-1.02) (-2.15) (-2.00)
↪→ qualified -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0002
(-0.44) (-0.12) (-0.25)
Own: previously leased 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
(0.69) (0.81) (1.01)
↪→ expired 0.0008∗∗ 0.0008∗ 0.0007∗
(2.41) (2.27) (2.16)
↪→ explored 0.0005 0.0007∗ 0.0007
(1.31) (1.64) (1.59)
↪→ qualified -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0006
(-1.36) (-1.96) (-1.87)
Calendar Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
N 538,003 538,003 538,003
Pseudo R2 0.069 0.083 0.084
Cluster robust z statistics in parentheses (clustered on lease).
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2.8: Exploration – logit model marginal effect estimates for characteristics of
individual lease-month.
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Dependent Variable: Drilled – lease i drilled in month t.
(1) (2) (3)
Neighbors: # leased 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0002∗∗∗
(3.91) (4.10)
Neighbors: # explored -8.15e-07 -7.15e-06
(-0.01) (-0.09)
Neighbors: # qualified 0.0003∗ 0.0002
(2.48) (1.79)
Neighbors: # producing -0.0001 -0.0001
(-1.17) (-0.98)
Neighbors: ∆ # leased 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0002∗∗∗
(3.99) (3.99)
Neighbors: ∆ # explored 0.0003∗∗ 0.0003∗∗∗
(2.99) (3.27)
Neighbors: ∆ # qualified -0.00001 -0.00006
(-0.12) (-0.40)
Neighbors: ∆ # producing -0.0003 -0.0003
(-1.94) (-1.87)
Neighbors: # leased (DWRRA) -0.00006
(-1.21)
Neighbors: # explored (DWRRA) 0.0001
(0.54)
Neighbors: # qualified (DWRRA) 0.00009
(0.27)
Neighbors: # producing (DWRRA) -0.0182∗∗∗
(-23.59)
Neighbors: ∆ # leased (DWRRA) -0.00005
(-0.92)
Neighbors: ∆ # explored (DWRRA) -0.0002
(-1.25)
Neighbors: ∆ # qualified (DWRRA) 0.0002
(0.57)
Neighbors: ∆ # producing (DWRRA) 0.0182
(25.89)
Calendar Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
N 538,003 538,003 538,003
Pseudo R2 0.069 0.083 0.084
Cluster robust z statistics in parentheses (clustered on lease).
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2.9: Exploration, continued – logit model marginal effect estimates for quanti-
ties of neighboring blocks/leases in different states of development.
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CHAPTER III
Estimates of the Value of Information
Externalities in Oil and Gas Exploration
3.1 Introduction
This research quantifies the implied value of information spillovers in oil and nat-
ural gas exploration via an event study design. I examine cumulative unpredicted
daily stock returns for firms owning leases adjacent to a lease where a hydrocarbon
discovery occurs, during the trading days immediately preceding and following that
discovery. In instances where the firms owning the discovery lease and the “neigh-
boring” lease are different companies, I interpret the accumulated stock returns of
the neighbor lease-owning firm as the value of new information. Combining leasing
data from the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) of the U.S. Gulf of Mexico and security
returns data from North American stock exchanges, I find that 25 trading days after
a discovery, firms that own leases adjacent to the discovery lease (but not the discov-
ery lease, itself) realize an average abnormal return that translates to $315 million in
market capitalization.
Exploratory drilling by the discovery lease owner generates a positive information
externality for the neighbor leaseholders (assuming that owners of the discovery and
neighbor leases are not coordinating their actions). Despite the fact that exploration
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produces a pecuniary externality – because the welfare effect on the neighboring
firm is transmitted through the (stock) price – this finding still carries efficiency
implications. Given that the estimated change in neighbor firm value is large relative
to exploratory drilling costs,1 these results suggest that the amount of exploration is
below the welfare-maximizing level as prospective explorers do not take into account
the high value of information that their activity could generate for their neighbors.
Information spillovers are an important component of hydrocarbon investment, if
for no reason other than to rationalize the observed leasing behavior of oil and natural
gas producers. This is because for the great majority of leases, particularly in deep
water, no drilling is ever undertaken by the leaseholder. Setting aside the influence of
technological and price changes, rational firms must have either believed at the time
of sale that they would earn positive returns from these undrilled leases and then
subsequent information caused them to revise these beliefs downward, or they valued
the option to drill and held out for the prospect that subsequent information would
place that option “in the money.” Note that these spillovers are made possible by a
combination of similar geology among geographically proximate leases and relatively
small geographic lease size.
This paper contributes to the existing economic literature by assigning an average
value to the information externality realized by the owners of neighboring leases fol-
lowing an oil discovery, which carries implications for the efficiency of the prevailing
level of exploration. Previous economic research, however, has appreciated the exis-
tence and importance of information spillover in oil exploration for several decades,
though without attempting to attach a value to them. Rather, past work has theo-
rized the existence of these externalities and also empirically tested for their effects.
1The daily rental rate or “day rate” charged for the use of drilling crafts called “semisubmersibles”
and “drillships” is the primary component of the costs of drilling an offshore well. During the period
1996-2008, the highest day rates were $503,000 and $650,000 for semisubmersibles and drillships,
respectively (source: ODS-Petrodata). For the 1,582 exploratory wells drilled in the deep water of
the Gulf of Mexico for the same period, the 90th percentile for days to drill the well is 98 days.
Therefore, a very rough estimate of the cost of drilling a well is 98× $650, 000 = $63, 700, 000.
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Some of the earlier studies to analyze information externalities in the context of oil
exploration include Gilbert (1981), Miller (1973), Peterson (1975), Stiglitz (1975),
and Leitzinger and Stiglitz (1984). Hendricks and Kovenock (1989) solve a dynamic
game theoretic model between two rival firms holding adjacent leases. They find that
both overinvestment and underinvestment are possible outcomes due to the presence
of private information. Finally, Hendricks and Porter (1996) show empirically that
information spillovers matter for subsequent investment. Using drilling data from the
Gulf of Mexico, they find that while winning bids are a strong predicter or explo-
ration shortly after a lease is sold, as time goes on, nearby drilling outcomes become
a stronger predictor, suggesting the importance of information spillovers.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: in section 2, I provide background
on offshore oil and gas leasing and exploration. In section 3, I describe the data used
and how I compiled it in order to conduct the analysis. I discuss the computation of
abnormal returns in section 4. In section 5, I present and interpret the results of the
event study analysis. Section 6 concludes.
3.2 U.S. Federal Offshore Oil and Gas Leasing
The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement (BOEMRE)
within the U.S. Department of Interior leases subsea tracts on the OCS to individ-
ual private firms or consortia of private firms.2 These tracts (called “blocks” when
unleased and “leases” when leased) are underwater parcels of land that usually mea-
sure three miles by three miles, covering an area of nine square-miles or 5,760 acres.
Individual blocks are leased in individual first-price sealed bid auctions. Generally
speaking, a single “lease offering,” which constitutes thousands of simultaneous first-
price sealed bid auctions, is held one time per calendar year per “planning area”
for all blocks in the planning area that are not leased at the time of the lease offer-
2BOEMRE succeeds the Mineral Management Service (MMS).
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ing.3 Although consortia can bid for and own leases, BOEMRE tries to encourage
competitiveness by limiting which consortia can be formed by prospective bidders.
Specifically, the largest firms in the industry cannot legally submit joint bids.4
Subject to BOEMRE’s determination that its bid reflects “fair market value,” the
prospective leaseholder that submits the highest bid then receives exclusive rights
to explore and develop the lease for a term of five years (200-399m), eight years
(400-799m), or ten years (≥ 800m) depending on the block’s predetermined depth
category (in parentheses). If the leaseholder does not begin production of hydro-
carbons during this term, then the lease is returned to the government to be made
available in subsequent auctions.5 Although, any activity which BOEMRE classifies
as “operations,” which includes drilling, can extend the lease beyond its primary term
(Mineral Management Service 2001, page 50). During the period prior to production,
the leaseholder pays an annual rental fee per lease acre which is due on the anniver-
sary of the lease becoming effective. Figure 2.3 shows the annual rental fee for the
various depth groups and for different years of sale – e.g. for a 5,760 acre lease sold in
1996 in greater than 800m of water, the total rental was $43,200 per year or $432,000
(in nominal terms) over the lifetime of the lease. The leaseholder can avoid these
payments by relinquishing the lease, i.e. ending the lease term early by surrendering
all rights to the acquired block. BOEMRE then re-offers the block for sale at the
next lease offering.
Following the drilling of an exploratory well, the leaseholder is required to submit
technical data gathered during the drilling process to BOEMRE (30 CFR 250.116).
3For administrative purposes, BOEMRE divides the Gulf of Mexico under U.S. jurisdiction into
three so-called planning areas: the Western Gulf of Mexico (WGM), the Central Gulf of Mexico
(CGM), and the Eastern Gulf of Mexico (EGM).
4As the level of concentration within upstream oil production has varied over time, so too has
BOEMRE’s “List of Restricted Joint Bidders.” The membership on the list covering the period from
November 1, 2003 through April 30, 2004, however, constitutes a useful snapshot: Exxon Mobil,
Shell, BP, TOTAL, Chevron Texaco, and Conoco Phillips.
5Leases with eight-year terms are canceled if an exploratory well is not drilled within the first
five years (Mineral Management Service 2001, page 50).
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Upon review of these data, BOEMRE determines whether the well is “qualifying,”
i.e. whether the well (and by extension, the lease) is “capable of production in paying
quantities.” Once a lease is deemed producible, BOEMRE assigns it to a “field.”6
Whereas the lease is the administrative unit within the OCS of the Gulf of Mexico,
the field is the geologic unit (and can be comprised of more than one lease). If
and only if the leaseholder commences hydrocarbon production on the lease following
successful exploration is the lease renewed indefinitely. In this case, BOEMRE waives
rental fees and begins royalty collection. For any leases in depths of less than 400m
sold prior to 2007, the royalty rate applied to production in the absence of any policy-
induced adjustments is 16.67%; the analogous rate for leases in water more than 400m
deep is 12.5%. Finally, once the lease has reached the end of its productive life, it is
decommissioned and the block is returned to BOEMRE.
3.3 Data
In this paper, I examine abnormal returns within an event window around the
discovery date for firms that own neighboring leases to the lease on which a hydro-
carbon discovery was made. An increase in abnormal returns during this period is
indicative of the value of new information about the company’s own lease generated
by the “good news” of the discovery on the neighboring lease. In order to measure
neighbors’ abnormal returns, I combine leasing data collected by BOEMRE with se-
curity price, return, and volume data collected by the Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP). While this describes my general approach, I provide much more detail
below.
6BOEMRE defines a field as “an area consisting of a single reservoir or multiple reservoirs all
grouped on, or related to, the same general geological structural feature and/or stratigraphic trap-
ping condition. There may be two or more reservoirs in a field that are separated vertically by
intervening impervious strata, or laterally by local geologic barriers, or both” (61 FR 12027).
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3.3.1 Discoveries
In constructing the analytic data set, I begin with a list of discoveries maintained
by BOEMRE called “Deepwater natural gas and oil discoveries and fields,” which is
comprised of all leases in U.S. Gulf of Mexico waters greater than 1,000 feet deep
on which a hydrocarbon discovery occurred, starting in 1975.7 The list only includes
discoveries that BOEMRE has classified as “qualifying”8 – meaning that BOEMRE
has reviewed technical data from the exploratory well and deemed the well (and by
the extension, the lease) as economically viable (30 CFR 250.116). Thus, while this
list is convenient in that it compiles various discoveries in a single location, it has
the added advantage that it features only those announced discoveries that have been
corroborated by a government review (although it should be noted that whether or
not a lease qualifies would not be known at the time of the discovery). BOEMRE
assigns any qualifying lease to a new or existing field, which represents the geological
structure existing under one or more leases. After eliminating duplicate observations
representing additional operators (the firms that perform the actual drilling) on the
same lease assigned to a given field, the list contains 440 lease-fields each representing
an instance where an operator drilled an exploratory well on the lease and BOEMRE
subsequently classified the lease as qualifying (i.e. the operator discovered a reservoir
capable of producing in “paying” quantities) and assigned it to a field.9
A potential shortcoming of these data is that the listed discovery date – the date
on which the firm reported the discovery to BOEMRE10 – takes the same value for
7BOEMRE makes this list available at the following location (which I most recently accessed on
3/19/2011): http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/homepg/offshore/deepwatr/deeptbl2.html.
8Gerald Crawford, BOEMRE, personal communication, 12/21/2010.
9The unit of observation is the “lease-field” rather than simply the lease because although there
are 440 observations, there are only 431 unique leases in these data. This is due to the fact that
nine leases are assigned to respective fields following exploration, and then later explored again and
assigned to a new field different from the first one. Also, the original data contained 453 lease-fields,
but 13 were dropped because they are in the Eastern Gulf of Mexico region planning area, for which
I have not constructed geographic data necessary for the analysis.
10Gerald Crawford, BOEMRE, personal communication, 12/21/2010.
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all leases that are assigned to the same field. Therefore, I interpret this variable
as the date when the field, rather than the lease, was discovered. The challenge is
then to determine which lease (of the up to 14 leases) assigned to the field actually
established the field, i.e. on which lease did an operator make the initial discovery?
Using the chronological order in which leases are assigned to a field along with a field
discovery indicator in the leasing data (described in the next section) that flags leases
where a discovery occurs, I identify a single lease for each field where the field was
actually discovered. Given that the 440 lease-fields represent 210 unique fields, the
final discovery data set has 210 observations. I will ignore the 230 leases that do not
establish any field (they are assigned to their respective field subsequent to another
lease which actually discovered that field) primarily because it is unclear what date is
appropriate for the “discovery” on those particular leases and secondarily because the
most valuable information will arguably be generated by the discovery of the initial
field rather than discoveries of extensions to that field.
3.3.2 Discovery Leases and Neighbor Leases
The 210 field discoveries discussed above constitute the set of events for the event
study. The area and block variables in these data provide the geographic location
where the discovery was made. I make this more precise by using GIS data. By
employing publicly-available BOEMRE data (coordinates in latitude and longitude
for each block in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico), for any block i, I can generate its set
of neighbor blocks.11 According to my own criteria, some lease j is classified as a
neighbor of lease i if j’s centroid (geographic center point) is within five miles of i’s
centroid, which for a standard 3-mile square blocks results in exactly eight adjacent
blocks in the set of neighbors (see Figure 3.1 for a graphical representation of a typical
grouping of 25 blocks in the Gulf of Mexico). Therefore, for most discoveries, there
11These data, called “Blocks,” are available in ASCII format by following link “8311” at
http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/homepg/pubinfo/repcat/arcinfo/index.html.
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will be up to eight leases on which information spillover might be captured. Of course,
to the extent that this can be observed at all, it must at least be the case that the
neighbor block is leased (which will not necessarily be the case).
Using publicly-available BOEMRE lease data, I match all leases ever associated
with a given neighbor block and then only keep those that are coincident with the
discovery (recall that a single block can be leased multiple times, each time receiving
a new lease number).12 Having mapped lease numbers to leased neighbor blocks
(analogous information for the discovery lease is contained with the discoveries data
already), I then access lease ownership spell data that BOEMRE makes public.13
Due to the active secondary market in leases, determining which firms own a lease
during the lease period is more challenging than checking which firm or consortium
of firms submitted the accepted winning bid for the lease. With the correct lease
number now associated with each lease (both discovery and neighbors), I then merge
all ownership spells ever associated with that lease keeping only the unique spell for
which the discovery date is contained within the interval defined by the spell’s start
and end dates. Importantly, the ownership spell data lists each firm that owns the
lease during the period that defines the spell and also its respective percent interest
in the lease during that spell. Each firm is identified by a numeric code assigned by
BOEMRE, which I simply call “company.” In the final analytic discovery lease owner
dataset, there are 310 “firm-discoveries” representing publicly-traded firms owning
a lease at the time of discovery. In the final analytic neighbor lease owner dataset,
there are 827 “firm-neighbors” representing publicly-traded firms owning a lease that
neighbors a lease where and when a discovery is made.
12These data are available in ASCII format by following link “LEASE DATA” at
http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/homepg/pubinfo/freeasci/leasing/freeleas.html.
13These data are available in ASCII format by following link “LEASE OWNER” at
http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/homepg/pubinfo/freeasci/leasing/freeleas.html.
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3.3.3 Firms and Securities
In order to compute the abnormal returns for these lease owners, it is neces-
sary to gather data on their equity returns. Such data are maintained by CRSP.
Not surprisingly, however, the CRSP data do not include the BOEMRE “company”
identifier and nor do the BOEMRE data include “permno,” the unique “permanent
security identification” number in the CRSP data. Therefore, in order to match firms
with their stock returns, I manually construct “company”-permno correspondences,
of which there can be several for a given value of “company.” To be precise, I do
not directly create the “company”-permno observations, rather for each “company”
value, I match appropriate values of “gvkey,” the “global company key” or unique
company identifier for each firm in COMPUSTAT. I accomplish this task by making
use of firm name and address information in the BOEMRE data and then conducting
string searches on the company name variable in COMPUSTAT. Next, I supplement
any findings by gleaning additional information from company web sites, articles from
periodicals archived online, and online firm databases geared to investors,14 among
other sources. One complicating factor in building the “company”-gvkey crosswalk is
the increased consolidation in the upstream oil and natural gas industries beginning
in the 1990s. In cases where a firm’s stock is de-listed following a merger or acquisi-
tion, I end all correspondences between the “company” value and the de-listed firm’s
gvkey value on the day prior to the “date of the de-listing payment” in the CRSP
database. Following that date, that “company” value will then correspond to the
acquiring firm’s gvkey value.
Before proceeding, I discuss why I perform the seemingly intermediate step of
matching “company” to gvkey values, instead of assigning permno values directly.
Note that unlike the unique firm identifier gvkey in COMPUSTAT, permno is the
14For example, the “Company Insight Center” from bloomberg.com and Business Week,
http://investing.businessweek.com/research/company/overview/overview.asp.
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unique security identifier in CRSP (although for companies that only ever have a
single issue of common stock, the permno value is unique to the firm). Further-
more, along with CRSP and Compustat databases, Wharton Research Data Services
(WRDS) also makes the CRSP/COMPUSTAT Merged (CCM) Database available
which associates the unique identifiers between each database. Therefore I focus on
determining firm-to-firm matches between the BOEMRE and COMPUSTAT data
and then rely on well-established correspondences between firms in COMPUSTAT
and securities in CRSP in order ultimately to establish mappings between firms in
the BOEMRE data and securities in CRSP. Once I have generated all necessary
“company”-to-gvkey mappings, I then merge these data to the CCM database. Each
line of the final crosswalk represents a unique “company” value and includes arrays
of permno values and dates where the latter define intervals over which the former
are correct or not. Applied to the BOEMRE data, this crosswalk allows the correct
security data to be matched to any firm on any given date. Using the unique list of
permno values in the crosswalk, I am then able to extract the CRSP “Daily Stock”
data, which includes information for equities that trade on North American exchanges
only.15
These securities correspond to the 84 unique firms present in the data, which
can be further divided into 116 unique “firm-spells” (referred to simply as “spells”
in the remainder of the paper). For example, although BP is a single firm that
operates during the entire sample period, it has five distinct spells in these data, each
representing the period following a major merger or acquisitions.16 I partition firms
into spells so that the coefficients of the normal returns model can vary flexibly with
the make-up of the firm.
15For example, Nippon Oil Exploration USA Limited is a subsidiary of Nippon Oil Corporation,
which trades on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Therefore, despite being publicly-traded, a company’s
equity returns can be missing from the data, though this is not common in the data.
16Besides M&A, the de-listing and initial public offering concludes and initiates a spell, respec-
tively.
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3.3.4 Commodity Prices
The daily one-month oil futures price, alternately known as the daily “nearby
delivery month” price (which functions as the spot price) for oil is used in estimating
the normal returns model in the following section. It is collected from the New York
Mercantile Exchange by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). These
data are also downloadable.17
3.4 Event Study
In order to estimate the value of information from a given discovery – for both
the owners of the lease where the discovery occurs and for the owners of neighboring
leases – I must first model the equity returns of any publicly-traded firm ever owning
a lease in the data. I accomplish this by estimating a normal returns model from the
abnormal returns will be derived (for a survey of the event study methodology, see
MacKinlay (1997). Obviously, the 210 unique discoveries in the data comprise the set
of events, and these can be indexed by d = 1, 2, . . . , 210. Furthermore, let td represent
the discovery date in calendar time for the d-th discovery (i.e. td is a realization of
the integer-valued variable t). The event window for the d-th discovery is the set of
31 trading days
Td = {t : t ∈ [td − 5, td + 25]}
which constitutes the period of time over which I will examine the response, if any,
of returns on the given security to the discovery.
These securities correspond to the 84 unique firms mentioned earlier, which can
be further divided into 116 unique spells representing different incarnations of the
firm (e.g. before-and-after a merger). Indexing the spells by i, I define Ti as the set
17From website http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet pri fut s1 d.htm.
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of trading days during which shares of the firm represented by spell i are actively
traded.18 These firms are included in the data because each is associated with at
least one discovery, as either the owner of the lease where the discovery occurred or
as the owner of a neighbor to that lease where the discovery occurred. Let Di be the
set of discoveries to which spell i is associated in this way, where
TDi =
⋃
d∈Di
Td
is the union of event windows for these discoveries.
The following normal returns model is estimated via OLS, separately for each spell
i:
Rit = α
i + βioRot + β
i
mRmt + εit, (3.1)
where the estimation sample is ∀t ∈ Ti\TDi , and Rit is the one-day return on the
firm’s equity, Rot is the one-day return on a barrel of oil, and Rmt is the one-day
return on the Standard & Poors 500 Composite Index. Note that I omit returns on
trading days within all event windows because arguably these returns are affected by
the event and their inclusion in the estimation of the normal model would therefore
undermine the estimation of the abnormal returns. The abnormal return is defined
as:
ARit ≡ Rit − Rˆit
≡ Rit − (αˆi + βˆioRot + βˆmRRmt),
i.e. within the event window, it is the out-of-sample residual return (the component
of the return not predicted by the model).
18Specifically, on North American stock exchanges during 01/02/1975 through 12/31/2010.
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Figures 3.2 and 3.3 plot mean abnormal returns (in terms of market capitalization)
within event window day t, for all event days t ∈ [−5, 25] for discovery lease owners
and neighbor lease owners, respectively. Although these graphs suggest that abnormal
returns converted to firm value are positive following a discovery, one should exercise
caution in interpreting them. The plots are not made using all of the data, specifically,
they exclude firm-days that appear in two different event windows simultaneously (for
example, if a firm owned two different leases each of which had a discovery within 31
trading days of each other). The reason for this exclusion is that it is not clear to
which value of t within the event window to assign such firm-days. Finally, the trends
marked “% ownership adjusted” are divided by the percentage of the lease held by
the firm (expressed as a proportion). So, for example, if a firm owns 50% of a lease,
then it’s abnormal return is weighted by 2. An analogous weighting scheme, applied
to RHS variables, is adopted for the regressions in the next section.
3.5 Empirical Analysis
3.5.1 Regression Variables
Having estimated the daily abnormal returns, I can now examine how this measure
changes within the event window around the discovery date. Before proceeding, I
define the following dependent variable, which will allow the coefficient estimates to
be expressed in terms of firm value:
A˜Rit = (ARit ×mkt capit),
where mkt capit is firm i’s market capitalization on trading day t – the product of
the share’s closing price and the number of publicly-held shares, both on trading day
t. Given the heterogeneity in firm size in the data, weighting abnormal returns by
market capitalization makes for easier interpretation of the sample statistics. With
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regard to the RHS variables, the building blocks for these are the following sets of
dummy variables:
dit =

1 if t trading days have passed since (if t > 0) or will pass prior to
(if t < 0) a discovery on a lease owned by firm i;
0 otherwise.
and
nit =

1 if t trading days have passed since (if t > 0) or will pass prior to
(if t < 0) a discovery on a lease to which a lease owned by firm i is a
neighbor;
0 otherwise.
For example, if firm i owns a lease where a discovery occurs on whatever calendar
date, then that date is indexed at t = 0 for that discovery’s event window and di0 = 1
for that firm. Likewise, s trading days after the discovery date, dis = 1. For some
firm j (which could be the same firm as i in the current example) that owns a lease
that neighbors the lease where the discovery occurred, nj0 = 1 on t = 0 and njs = 1
s trading days after the discovery.
Note that it is very often the case in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico that an individual
lease will be jointly-owned by several firms simultaneously. In order to account for
this in the analysis, I introduce the following variables, which are defined for all t
values for which dit and nit are defined:
Dit = dit × d pctit
Nit = nit × n pctit,
where d pctit is firm i’s percent ownership interest in the lease where the discovery
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occurs and n pctit is the sum of firm i’s percent ownership interests in the leases in the
neighbor set of the lease where the discovery occurs (in all cases, percent ownership
is expressed as a proportion).19
Finally, in one specification, I interact the percent ownership-weighted event day
dummies with a variable measuring the distance in miles from the (centroid of the)
discovery lease to the (centroid of the) nearest lease that produced positive quantities
of oil or natural gas during the six months prior to the date of discovery. If one imag-
ines a lease where a discovery occurs on date t, this distance variable is represented
by d distit if firm i owns the lease and n distit if firm i owns a neighboring lease.
20
3.5.2 Regression Models: Baseline Specifications
I estimate two baseline specifications. The first of these is
A˜Rit = α +
25∑
t=−5
βtDit +
25∑
t=−5
γtNit + it. (3.2)
The individual day t coefficient (when summed with α) is the mean abnormal return
on day t for either discovery lease owners or neighbors. In the context of summing
up these coefficients, the individual day t coefficient constitutes the marginal effect of
event day t on the cumulative abnormal return. So, in this simplest specification, the
γ’s will represent the value of the information spillover. If the information externality
does exist (and is perceived by the market to be valuable), then we expect that the
γ’s would be positive when summed after t = 0.
Of course, a weakness of this specification is the fact that it cannot distinguish
between neighbor firms that own the discovery lease and those that do not. Given the
19Returning to the lower panel of Figure 3.1, imagine that a discovery occurs on lease M. Fur-
thermore, assume that the same firm owns 50% of lease H and 25% of lease N, both of which are
in M’s neighbor set. In this case, n pctit = 0.25 + 0.5 = 0.75. This summation also applies across
discoveries in instances where a firm owns leases neighboring two different discoveries having the
same discovery date.
20If two different discoveries share the same date, and firm i owns leases neighboring both, then
n distit will be the average distance for the two discovery leases.
72
paper’s interest in information that cannot be internalized by the firm undertaking
the investment, I would like to be able to separate these two types of neighbors, which
motivates the second baseline specification:
A˜Rit = α +
25∑
t=−5
βtDit +
25∑
t=−5
γtNit +
25∑
t=−5
δtDitNit + it. (3.3)
In (3.3), the summed γ’s represent the event day effect on the cumulative abnormal
returns of firms that simultaneously own lease(s) that neighbor a lease where a dis-
covery occurs and do not own the actual lease where the discovery was made. It is
these firms that will capture the spillover, if one exists.
3.5.3 Regression Models: Extensions
The extensions to the baseline models discussed below allow for the estimation of
more flexible effects. Specifically, the value of the spillover is permitted to vary with
the “intensity” of other variables that arguably affect its value – distance from existing
production and oil price. A variation of (3.3), the first extension adds interactions
with a variable measuring the distance of the discovery lease from existing production
at the time of the discovery:
A˜Rit = α +
25∑
t=−5
βtDit +
25∑
t=−5
γtNit +
25∑
t=−5
δtDitNit
+
25∑
t=−5
ζt(d distit ·Dit) +
25∑
t=−5
ηt(n distit ·Nit) +
25∑
t=−5
θt(d distit ·DitNit)
+ it. (3.4)
In this way, the marginal effect of being in day t of the event window is permitted
to vary (additively) with distance from current (as of the discovery) production. The
logic for the inclusion of these additional terms is as follows: the abnormal return
represents the return not predicted by the market, and we might expect that there is
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greater uncertainty regarding drilling in areas further away from existing production,
i.e. in less established areas of the Gulf of Mexico. This specification will pick up any
such effect.
The final two extensions incorporate the oil price. The first of these is another
variation of (3.3):
A˜Rit = α +
25∑
t=−5
βtDit +
25∑
t=−5
γtNit +
25∑
t=−5
δtDitNit
+
25∑
t=−5
ιt(p0 ·Dit) +
25∑
t=−5
κt(p0 ·Nit) +
25∑
t=−5
λt(p0 ·DitNit) + it (3.5)
where p0 is the real price of oil on the date of the discovery (or the most recent day
on which oil is traded, if the discovery occurs on a weekend or holiday). The effect of
the trading day on the abnormal return is now permitted to vary with the oil price
at the time of the discovery. Lastly, the specification
A˜Rit = α +
25∑
t=−5
ιt(p0 ·Dit) +
25∑
t=−5
κt(p0 ·Nit) +
25∑
t=−5
λt(p0 ·DitNit) + it (3.6)
drops the estimated mean effects in (3.5) (the β’s, γ’s, and δ’s), taking into account
directly the effect of oil price on the discovery date in estimating the coefficients.
3.5.4 Results and Discussion
In presenting the results, I emphasize the sums of estimated coefficients from the
beginning of the event window forward, rather than the sum of coefficients for event
days t = 0 and t = 1, for example (or for that matter, just the estimated coefficient
for t = 1). I employ this strategy because although the theory of efficient markets
holds that any new information should be capitalized in asset prices instantaneously
upon its release, it is not clear in this context that investors can fully and immediately
appreciate the value of a new hydrocarbon discovery in terms of present discounted
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value of future profits from the new reservoir on or even one day after the date of the
discovery. In using the [-5,25] trading days event window, I allow for investors to first
learn of then about each discovery. Then, summing over trading day coefficients, I
get a measure of the cumulative abnormal return and an estimate of the market value
of new information.
Before continuing, it is also worth detailing what is known regarding the chan-
nels by which information about discoveries is conveyed to the market. Although
BOEMRE publishes the list of discoveries – “Deepwater natural gas and oil discover-
ies and fields” – on its website, the discovery date listed therein is not the date when
information about the discovery was formally signalled to investors. From discussions
with a BOEMRE official, I have learned that BOEMRE never formally announces
discoveries, rather it simply updates “Deepwater natural gas and oil discoveries and
fields” on a monthly basis.21 The investor responses in terms of cumulative abnor-
mal returns detected in the data, however, imply that the listed discovery date does
coincide with the receipt of information by market participants (see, for example,
Figures 3.7 and 3.8, where the graphed cumulative abnormal returns deviate from 0
beginning at t = 0). Market movements in the absence of formal announcements sug-
gest that there exist informal mechanisms by which the information contained in the
firm’s revelation of the discovery to the government is still conveyed to the broader
markets.
Individual coefficient estimates for baseline specifications (3.2) and (3.3) are pre-
sented in tables 3.1 and 3.2, respectively (note: although I present the results for
specifications (3.4), (3.5), (3.6) graphically, I do not include analogous tables with
individual coefficient estimates). For ease of interpretation and also to emphasize
cumulative abnormal returns rather than abnormal returns, I graphically present
summed regression coefficients along with their associated 95% confidence intervals
21Gerald Crawford, BOEMRE, personal communication, 9/1/2011.
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in Figures 3.4 through 3.18. Each of these figures also includes a line at zero. In-
stances where the zero line falls within the confidence interval is equivalent to failing
to reject the null hypothesis in a Wald test with the single linear restriction that∑t
s=−5 βs = 0 in the case of the baseline specification (3.2), for instance.
The summed coefficient estimates for (3.2) can be seen in the lower panels of Fig-
ures 3.4 and 3.5. In this case, the results suggest that firms owning the discovery
receive a negative return while their neighbors experience a positive return (summed
over the 25 trading days following the discovery at t = 0). As mentioned earlier
though, a weakness of this specification is that it does not control for different effects
for neighbors depending on whether they own the lease where the discovery occurs.
Given that the fundamental issue is one of an externality that cannot be internalized
by the discovery owner (which cannot control whether neighbors learn of its discov-
ery), we want to make sure that we are estimating the effect for neighbors that do
not own the discovery lease.
Specification (3.3) allows for this, and we proceed to it next. Focusing on Figure
3.8, we see that after 25 trading days, the sum of estimated coefficients (the γ’s) is
approximately $315 million and is significantly different from 0. In this case, these
neighbors do not own the lease where the discovery occurred – just some lease that
is adjacent to that lease – so this represents the spillover in which our interest lies.
Note that in the case of discovery owners, the cumulative abnormal return is roughly
$100 million 25 trading days after the discovery, though throughout most of the event
window, the cumulative abnormal return is negative. In any event, the cumulative
abnormal return is significantly different from 0 for only a short time early in the event
window (see Figure (3.6)). Finally, for owners of neighbor leases that also own the
discovery lease, the estimated cumulative abnormal return 25 days after the discovery
is approximately negative $400 million, which is statistically significant (see Figure
(3.7)).
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In the baseline specifications, the point estimates for the lease owner (whether they
own neighbor leases or not) are somewhat counterintuitive: the discovery-owning firm
paradoxically realizes a loss in equity value following its own discovery. For discovery
lease owners, the estimated cumulative abnormal return is negative in the baseline
specifications, while it is either generally positive or near 0 in the extensions. In all
cases other than the simpler baseline specification, the cumulative abnormal return
is not significantly different from 0 at the end of the event window. The paradox of
negative returns for a discovery is also present for firms owning neighboring leases and
the discovery lease. This result, along with positive point estimates for cumulative
abnormal returns for neighbor lease owners that do not also own the discovery lease,
is remarkably stable (at least with regard to the signs of the effects) from the richer
baseline specification, (3.3), through the extensions. This fact suggests that the
counterintuitive pattern in the results is roughly invariant to the model specification
(at least for those models presented here).
As consistent as the narrative described above is in the results, it is difficult to
rationalize. In effect, the estimates imply that gaining direct access to a new hydro-
carbon reservoir is not as valuable as upwardly updated beliefs about gaining direct
access to a new hydrocarbon reservoir.22 Though the event window for this analy-
sis is constructed to start five trading days before the discovery date and to end 25
trading days after the discovery date, this does not preclude meaningful unpredicted
movements in the return on firms’ equity from occurring outside of this interval, par-
ticularly for firms owning discovery leases. More to the point, perhaps investors have
already built the value of the discovery into the equity price of eventual discovery
lease owners by the time the firm informs the government of the discovery (trading
day t = 0 in the analysis). Given both the daunting technical challenges and the
22While a neighbor’s discovery of a new deposit will likely cause a lease-holding firm to be more
optimistic regarding a potential discovery on its own lease, it certainly does not guarantee that a
discovery will occur on its lease.
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relative scarcity of the necessary drilling capital, hydrocarbon exploration in deep
water is exceedingly expensive and therefore rare. Thus, when a leaseholder under-
takes a drilling plan, it does so only after having done everything short of drilling to
determine with as much certainty as possible what oil and natural gas are present on
the lease. In this way, the decision to drill potentially conveys a great deal of infor-
mation regarding the firm’s future profits. If investors wait for confirmation of the
discovery, however, to invest in firms that hold leases adjacent to the explored lease,
then we would observe the counterintuitive results seen in this paper. Furthermore, in
these data, only successful exploration is included. If investors are purchasing stock
in exploring firms before the outcome of the exploration is known with certainty,
then we would expect returns on equity to fall for these firms following unsuccessful
exploration (as stockholders divested).
Of course, in this context it is not the value of a discovery that ultimately mat-
ters, but rather the value of the discovery relative to the stock market’s expectations
about the value. This implies that exploration need not be unsuccessful in order to
observe the counterintuitive pattern in the data. These results could arise because
investors are generally overoptimistic (or possess accurate expectations) regarding
the value of new discoveries for firms that own the discovery lease, while simultane-
ously being overly pessimistic with respect to the value of new discoveries for firms
owning neighboring leases. In this scenario, with the onset of exploratory drilling,
investors update their beliefs about the firms’ profitabilities and then subsequently
update them again with the occurrence of the discovery. It is in this second round of
updating, with the confirmation of the discovery, that firms can evaluate the accuracy
of the initial beliefs that they established when mere exploration began. Information
regarding the discovery that is not observed by the econometrician but available to
investors (at the time of the discovery) would serve as the basis for their updated
beliefs about firms’ profitability. Initial over-optimism results in divestment in shares
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of discovery-lease-owning firms while initial over-pessimism results in investment in
neighbor-lease-owning firms, consistent with the pattern in the data.
Finally, note that although the extensions to the baseline specifications generate
point estimates for the cumulative abnormal return that are largely consistent with
those produced by the baseline specifications, the estimated effects are not signifi-
cantly different from 0. These results are presented in the lower panels of Figures
3.10 to 3.18. Given that all of the event day marginal effects include at least one
interacted term (with distance or price), in order to present numeric results, I have
to select specific values of distance and price at which to evaluate the marginal effect.
For Figures 3.10 to 3.12, I used the median distance for both discovery leases and
neighbor leases (19.4 and 16.4 miles, respectively). The distributions of the distance
variable for the discovery and neighbor leases are presented as Figure 3.9. For Figures
3.13 to 3.18, I use the average (real) oil prices across discovery and neighbor leases at
the time of the discovery: $41.58 and $43.97, respectively. The fact that the introduc-
tion of interacted terms in the baseline specifications does not produce statistically
significant effects on the cumulative abnormal return suggests that the value of the
information spillovers does not vary with distance from existing production or with
the oil price at the time of the discovery.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I have used securities data along with hydrocarbon leasing data
to estimate the value of information spillovers from exploration. In my preferred
specification, among firms owning neighbor leases, I separate those that also own
the discovery leases from those that do not. For the latter group, I estimate that
25 trading days after the discovery, firm value increases by $315 million, a large
and statistically significant result. This finding is novel because it represents a first
attempt at trying to measure that value of these information spillovers, though the
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literature has regarded these externalities as important for some time. Given the
high estimated value of this information, there is reason to believe that the amount
of drilling is inefficiently low (at least from the standpoint of direct costs of oil and
natural gas exploration).
3.7 Appendix: Examining differences between Figures 3.2
and 3.4
A surprising result in the paper is the apparent disagreement between Figure
3.2 and the lower panel of Figure 3.4. Figure 3.2 graphs the sums of mean (within
trading day across firms) abnormal returns from event day s = −5 through event
day s = t while the lower panel of Figure 3.4 plots the sums of the βs coefficients
from specification (3.2) for event days s = −5 through s = t (estimated for all firm-
days, inside and outside of event windows). The former shows a positive cumulative
abnormal return during almost all trading days within the event window while the
latter indicates a negative cumulative abnormal return in all trading days within the
event window.
In what follows, I describe two avenues that might account for the discrepancy.
First, note that (3.2) includes variables in the estimation (the Nit) that will affect
the βs coefficient estimates while being completely absent from the computation of
the means in Figure 3.2. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the samples used
to construct the two figures are different. In order to compute the means in Figure
3.2, I limited the firm-days to only those appearing in exactly one event window at a
time, i.e. firm-days for which
∑25
t=−5 dit = 1. I was then able to assign a trading day
value (corresponding to the unique trading day dummy variable equalling 1) to that
firm-day for the purpose of computing the trading day mean abnormal return. This
step was necessary because it is not clear which trading day value to assign to a firm-
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day that exists in multiple event windows simultaneously.23 By eliminating firm-days
appearing in multiple event windows at the same time, the number of observations is
reduced from 9,161 to 8,722 (a 4.79% reduction). The number of observations used
in the estimation of (3.2) is 321,275, of which 9,052 firm-days are in at least one
event window.24 Of course, estimation of (3.2) easily accommodates instances where
a firm-day is in more than one event window at a time.
Next, taking into account the two features described above, I try to generate
means and coefficients that are more directly comparable. Thus, in the estimation
sample, for each observation for which
∑
dit = x, I generate exactly x observations
(one for each event window that the firm-day is in, including 0 observations if the
firm-day is in no event window). The resulting sample has 9,492 observations, each
in exactly one event window. I then estimate the following model on this sample via
OLS:
A˜Rit
d pctit
= α +
−1∑
t=−5
βtdit +
25∑
t=1
βtdit + it. (3.7)
where di0 is omitted to avoid perfect multicollinearity. I also compute event day
means:
µt = n
−1
t
nt∑
i=1
A˜Rit
d pctit
∀t ∈ [−5, 25]
where nt equals the number of firm-days in event day t.
Of course, because the focus is on cumulative abnormal returns through event day
23This circumstance applies to any firm owning at least two leases, where a discovery is made on
one, and then within 30 trading days, a discovery is made on the other lease, as well.
24Missing values for variables in (3.2) for 109 observations accounts for the difference between the
number of firm-days in the means and coefficients samples.
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t, the objects of interest are
t∑
β ≡

∑−1
s=−5 βs if t < 0,∑−1
s=−5 βs +
∑25
s=1 βs if t > 0,
and
t∑
µ ≡
t∑
s=−5
(
n−1s
ns∑
i=1
A˜Ris
d pctis
)
.
For the sample described above, both trends are plotted in Figure 3.19 as “Summed
Coefficient Values through t” and “Summed Mean Values through t,” respectively.
The summed mean and summed coefficient trends plotted in Figure 3.19 are clearly
very closely related, but they are not identical. To account for the disparity, first imag-
ine a categorical variable having S categories (that can be indexed by s = 1, 2, . . . , S)
each being a disjoint set; in other words: each individual is in one and exactly one
category. Then, for some variable y, let µs and βs represent the s-th category mean
for y and the OLS coefficient on the dummy variable for the s-th category with y as
the dependent variable, respectively. In an OLS regression on a constant term and
indicator variables for S − 1 of the S categories,
µs = α + βs.
Summing over the first t ≤ S categories yields the following:
t∑
s=1
µs = tα +
t∑
s=1
βs, (3.8)
thus relating the summed means and summed OLS coefficients. The two upper trends
in Figure 3.19 are consistent with (3.8); their difference is fully accounted for by the
linear “Summed Intercept Values through t” trend (the “tα” term in (3.8)).
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As expected, the “Cumulative Abnormal Returns (% Ownership Adjusted)” trend
in Figure 3.2 and the “Summed Mean Values through t” trend in Figure 3.19 have
the same shape (if not the same levels; these are not exactly identical because the
samples are slightly different – see above). The inclusion of this appendix is motivated,
however, by the fact that the “Summed Coefficients” trend in Figure 3.4 and the
“Summed Coefficient Values through t” trend in Figure 3.19 appear so differently.
The principal difference between the two graphs is in the handling of firm-days that
appear in more than one event window simultaneously in the samples used to generate
the graphs. Apparently, inclusion of these observations as they appear in the data
(rather than in the synthetic way used to created Figure 3.19) very negatively affects
the coefficient estimates. That this is the case is made clear by the conditional means.
For the 8,622 firm-days appearing in exactly one event window, the mean abnormal
return (in millions of dollars of market capitalization) is 15.02. The corresponding
mean for the 430 firm-days appearing in more than one event window on the given
trading day is -45.44.
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Figure 3.1: Set of neighbor blocks for a lease of standard size and shape.
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Figure 3.2: Mean cumulative abnormal returns (weighted by market capitalization,
then averaged) for publicly-traded firms that own discovery leases.
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Figure 3.3: Mean cumulative abnormal returns (weighted by market capitalization,
then averaged) for publicly-traded firms owning leases that neighbor a
discovery lease.
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Figure 3.4: Coefficient estimates: βt and
∑
βt in (3.2).
87
Figure 3.5: Coefficient estimates: γt and
∑
γt in (3.2).
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Figure 3.6: Coefficient estimates: βt and
∑
βt in (3.3).
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Figure 3.7: Coefficient estimates: δt and
∑
δt in (3.3).
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Figure 3.8: Coefficient estimates: γt and
∑
γt in (3.3).
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Figure 3.9: Distributions of distance variable for discovery and neighbor leases.
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Figure 3.10: Coefficient estimates: (βt + ζtd distit) and
∑
(βt + ζtd distit) in (3.4).
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Figure 3.11: Coefficient estimates: (δt + θtd distit) and
∑
(δt + θtd distit) in (3.4).
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Figure 3.12: Coefficient estimates: (γt + ηtd distit) and
∑
(γt + ηtd distit) in (3.4).
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Figure 3.13: Coefficient estimates: (βt + ιtp0) and
∑
(βt + ιtp0) in (3.5).
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Figure 3.14: Coefficient estimates: (δt + λtp0) and
∑
(δt + λtp0) in (3.5).
97
Figure 3.15: Coefficient estimates: (γt + κtp0) and
∑
(γt + κtp0) in (3.5).
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Figure 3.16: Coefficient estimates: ιtp0 and
∑
ιtp0 in (3.6).
99
Figure 3.17: Coefficient estimates: λtp0 and
∑
λtp0 in (3.6).
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Figure 3.18: Coefficient estimates: κtp0 and
∑
κtp0 in (3.6).
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Figure 3.19: Comparison of cumulative abnormal returns computed using means and
OLS estimates.
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Dit Nit
Event Day βˆt S.E. γˆt S.E.
-5 -136.0∗ (59.0) -20.3 (13.9)
-4 -35.4 (58.6) 3.6 (13.8)
-3 -62.0 (58.8) -7.7 (13.7)
-2 -13.6 (58.6) 3.2 (13.8)
-1 -91.7 (58.8) 10.6 (13.7)
0 -65.7 (58.8) 13.9 (13.7)
1 -233.1∗∗∗ (58.2) 41.3∗∗ (13.6)
2 -187.3∗∗ (58.4) 52.6∗∗∗ (13.7)
3 -136.2∗ (58.5) 92.3∗∗∗ (13.7)
4 155.0∗∗ (58.2) -60.7∗∗∗ (13.6)
5 -72.5 (58.8) -28.6∗ (13.7)
6 -75.3 (58.6) 53.5∗∗∗ (13.7)
7 -2.7 (58.2) -9.2 (13.6)
8 51.6 (58.8) -10.0 (13.7)
9 61.1 (58.7) 20.5 (13.7)
10 -14.4 (58.4) 50.1∗∗∗ (13.6)
11 -61.3 (58.2) -26.9∗ (13.6)
12 51.1 (58.2) 1.6 (13.6)
13 -120.1∗ (59.1) 23.1 (13.9)
14 -0.2 (59.0) -73.8∗∗∗ (13.8)
15 171.5∗∗ (58.7) 21.2 (13.7)
16 -210.1∗∗∗ (58.9) 42.0∗∗ (13.7)
17 -110.5 (58.3) 31.9∗ (13.7)
18 218.5∗∗∗ (59.0) 22.0 (13.7)
19 84.5 (58.5) -40.9∗∗ (13.7)
20 128.0∗ (58.1) 56.6∗∗∗ (13.6)
21 24.8 (58.1) 22.4 (13.6)
22 23.8 (58.1) -39.3∗∗ (13.6)
23 12.6 (58.2) 21.0 (13.7)
24 169.8∗∗ (58.3) -31.9∗ (13.7)
25 49.1 (58.1) 3.0 (13.6)
N 321,275
R2 0.001
Intercept estimate is 1.5 with standard error of 0.9.
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.1: Estimates for baseline specification (3.2).
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Dit Nit DitNit
Event Day βˆt S.E. γˆt S.E. δˆt S.E.
-5 -203.5∗∗ (68.3) -32.1∗ (15.2) 54.7 (28.6)
-4 51.2 (67.9) 17.6 (15.1) -70.2∗ (28.5)
-3 -35.0 (68.4) -4.0 (15.0) -21.7 (28.2)
-2 -46.8 (68.3) -2.2 (15.0) 25.7 (28.6)
-1 -93.3 (68.6) 12.5 (15.0) -6.1 (28.4)
0 -64.1 (68.6) 17.9 (15.0) -8.5 (28.6)
1 -95.6 (67.8) 64.0∗∗∗ (14.8) -107.3∗∗∗ (28.1)
2 -58.2 (68.0) 73.5∗∗∗ (14.9) -102.2∗∗∗ (28.4)
3 17.3 (68.1) 119.9∗∗∗ (14.9) -128.2∗∗∗ (28.6)
4 324.3∗∗∗ (67.8) -32.0∗ (14.8) -138.0∗∗∗ (28.1)
5 -170.3∗ (68.3) -45.9∗∗ (14.9) 79.5∗∗ (28.2)
6 -164.3∗ (68.2) 36.5∗ (14.9) 73.9∗∗ (28.2)
7 176.8∗∗ (67.8) 20.5 (14.8) -144.9∗∗∗ (28.1)
8 -28.2 (68.8) -22.8 (14.9) 61.1∗ (28.3)
9 -26.5 (68.6) 4.5 (14.9) 72.9∗∗ (28.3)
10 79.3 (67.8) 65.6∗∗∗ (14.9) -74.7∗∗ (28.2)
11 71.1 (67.9) -3.8 (14.9) -107.4∗∗∗ (28.2)
12 197.3∗∗ (67.8) 25.8 (14.8) -116.6∗∗∗ (28.1)
13 -200.1∗∗ (68.5) 9.5 (15.1) 62.8∗ (28.3)
14 -31.6 (68.4) -79.1∗∗∗ (15.1) 22.8 (28.2)
15 171.3∗ (68.5) 21.5 (14.9) -3.4 (28.2)
16 -114.5 (68.7) 58.4∗∗∗ (14.9) -77.1∗∗ (28.2)
17 -62.4 (67.8) 38.1∗ (14.9) -34.4 (28.2)
18 259.7∗∗∗ (68.8) 27.2 (15.0) -29.1 (28.5)
19 10.4 (68.3) -54.8∗∗∗ (14.9) 63.4∗ (28.2)
20 119.5 (67.6) 53.0∗∗∗ (14.8) 11.5 (28.1)
21 -116.8 (67.6) -5.0 (14.8) 118.2∗∗∗ (28.1)
22 -57.9 (67.6) -55.5∗∗∗ (14.8) 70.1∗ (28.1)
23 51.0 (67.8) 28.5 (14.9) -34.1 (28.3)
24 76.0 (67.9) -47.4∗∗ (15.0) 73.8∗∗ (28.3)
25 70.9 (67.6) 5.4 (14.8) -10.5 (28.1)
N 321,275
R2 0.002
Intercept estimate is 1.2 with standard error of 0.9.
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.2: Estimates for specification (3.3).
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CHAPTER IV
Secondary Recovery and Oil Price
4.1 Introduction
In order for the economic value of underground oil to be realized, it must either
be pumped from its reservoir by applying energy from the surface or it must be
forced upwards by pressure from the reservoir, itself. In the latter case, as production
persists, the pressure from the reservoir is dissipated meaning that less oil is produced
per unit effort and time. In some circumstances, however, the operator can counteract
this effect by injecting water into the formation. With this research, I examine how
the amount of water injected, conditional on the well being able to inject, is affected
by the price of oil. I find that a $1 increase in average monthly oil price increases
the monthly volume of water injected by 647 to 964 barrels, though these coefficient
estimates are not necessarily robust to different estimators for the error matrix.
This research has implications for the collection of royalties from older oil and
gas fields where injection occurs. The royalty, a percentage tax applied directly
to the per unit price of oil or natural gas (either 1
6
or 1
8
for production from the
U.S. Gulf of Mexico), is equivalent to a price decrease from the standpoint of the
hydrocarbon producer. With injection being sensitive to price, the implication is that
the presence of the royalty will lessen the amount of injection carried out on older
fields and therefore ultimately lower production. This represents a less obvious but
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still potentially important inefficiency due to royalty collection. Additional research
that explicitly quantifies the increase in ultimate production for a specific level of
injection, in concert with these results, could allow for the estimation of this particular
aspect of the total welfare loss due to the royalty.1
This area of research has received little attention. Amit (1986) theoretically exam-
ines the question of when to switch from not injecting to injecting during production
from the reservoir. While his model generates a number of implications, he does
not test them empirically. A recent paper that is empirical in nature is Rao (2009),
however, she examines production rather than injection. Using data for onshore oil
wells during 1977-2008, she exploits variation in the federal Windfall Profit Tax to
estimate an after-tax price elasticity of production of roughly 0.23.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: in section 2, I provide relevant
background on oil production. In section 3, I describe the data used and how I
compiled it in order to conduct the analysis. I present a theory of optimal production
during the secondary recovery phase in section 4. In section 5, I present and discuss
the results. Section 6 concludes.
4.2 Background
Given that any underground reservoir containing fluids such as oil, water, and
natural gas is a high temperature and high pressure environment, these fluids will be
compressed relative to their densities at surface temperature and pressure conditions.
Any reduction in pressure on these fluids will cause them to increase in volume2 The
expansion of fluids still in the reservoir in response to the removal of some volume
1Note that although the most logical object to estimate for these purposes is the price elasticity
of injection, estimation of this parameter, at least using a log-log specification, is complicated by
the fact that the injected volume in most months for an injection-capable string is zero.
2The actual drop in pressure (dP ) for a change in the volume of fluid (dV ) will be governed by the
“compressibility,” C, of the reservoir fluids, according to the following relationship: dP = − 1C · dVV .
Rearrangement of this expression yields the formula for compressibility: C ≡ − 1V · dVdP , which is
defined as “the fractional change in volume per unit change in pressure” (Jahn et al. (1998)).
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of other fluid acts as a source of drive energy to support “primary recovery” – i.e.
pressure from the reservoir itself drives the resource to the surface (Jahn et al. (1998)).
Of course the expansion of these fluids depends very much on the specific attributes
of the given reservoir and its fluids. For example, oil’s compressibility depends on
the amount of dissolved gas it holds, which if it occurs in very small amounts lowers
the oil’s compressibility resulting in large pressure drops in the reservoir after only
limited oil production. In the instance where oil expansion is the sole method of
support for pressure in such a reservoir, conditions for abandonment of the formation
will be reached rapidly with total production amounting to less than 5% of the oil
originally in place (Jahn et al. (1998)).
When possible, injection provides a potential remedy to such situations. Otherwise
known as “secondary recovery,” this constitutes the adding of energy to the reservoir
by injecting fluids (usually water or gas) in order to maintain the reservoir’s pressure
as production occurs (Jahn et al. (1998)). The actual injection is carried out via a
well, and in the case of offshore production, water is gathered on site and then forced
into the reservoir. Two important and related distinctions need be made between
the primary and secondary recovery phases. First, the operator does not incur any
cost to displace the resource to the surface during the former, while in the course of
the latter, it does (e.g. the cost of injecting water into the reservoir). Second, in the
primary recovery stage, the producer does not directly control the recovery rate (it
is just due to natural drive), but during the secondary recovery stage, the operator
selects the production rate (Amit (1986)). Finally, it should be noted that after the
primary and even secondary recovery phases, 40-85% of hydrocarbons are usually
not recovered, especially for oil fields (Jahn et al. (1998)). Although not examined
in the paper, more costly and technically challenging methods know collectively as
“enhanced oil recovery” (EOR) are oftentimes then applied to reservoirs in order to
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increase the ultimate recovery.3
4.3 Data
The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE,
the successor agency to the Mineral Management Service) requires that entities hold-
ing any federal oil and gas leases submit a monthly “Oil and Gas Operations Re-
port” (OGOR-A) for each well, from the month that drilling is concluded until the
month the well is plugged and permanently abandoned (Minerals Management Ser-
vice (2002), page 2-6). Along with total oil production (in barrels) and natural gas
production (in thousand of cubic feet), the leaseholder reports the total barrels of
water injected into the reservoir via the well during the course of the month. The
OGOR-A form can be seen in Figure 4.1; the space for reporting water (or gas, in the
case of gas injection) injection volume is marked with “21.” The instructions for filling
in this entry are straightforward: “Enter the volume of oil, gas, or water injected into
the well” (Minerals Management Service (2002), page 5-9).
BOEMRE has collected OGOR data since 1947 and makes the data available
online from 1996 onwards. For a nominal fee, I purchased from BOEMRE the entire
1947-2011 panel of OGOR-A data collected for production on federal leases in the
U.S. Gulf of Mexico.4 The basic cross sectional unit in these data goes by any of the
following names: a “production string,” “production tubing,” or “tubing string,” and
I will refer to them as “strings” in the remainder of the text. An individual string
can be thought of as a hose that conveys material from the reservoir to the surface
(in the case of production) or vice-versa (in the case of injection). A path from a hole
drilled in the seabed (a wellhead) to a unique bottom location constitutes a well, in
which multiple strings might operate simultaneously. Similarly, multiple wells might
3EOR techniques include steam injection, in-situ combustion, miscible fluid displacement, and
polymer augmented water flood.
4I bought the data at https://www.gomr.boemre.gov/WebStore/front.asp for $80.
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originate at the same wellhead. Finally, the individual unit of production is the lease,
and different leases associated with the same geological configuration are grouped
into the same field (by determination of BOEMRE).
The 1947-2011 OGOR-A panel has 7,400,832 observations, each representing a
string-month for an oil or gas lease in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico during that period.5
Closer examination of these data reveals that some strings report their well status
as abandoned starting at some month in the data and then continue to report aban-
donment for all subsequent months in the sample.6 Starting from the first month
that one of these strings reports a code for abandonment, I drop the strings for that
month and for all subsequent months (if in all subsequent months the string is also
reported as abandoned).
With the removal of all string-months for strings subsequent to that string be-
ing rendered incapable or production or injection, the remaining OGOR-A data has
6,694,738 observations. While some string-months are reported to be used for wa-
ter injection as early as 1967 (according to the well status variable in the OGOR-A
data), the variable that measures water injection is 0 for all observations prior to
1985. This suggests that although injection likely occurred prior to 1985, BOEMRE
did not record it. For my purposes, I therefore treat injection prior to 1985 as missing,
and so I limit the data to string-months from 1985 and later for a total of 4,553,875
observations. Panel (1) of Table 4.1 lists the number of unique individuals at each of
the levels of data described above: strings, wells, etc. For instance, there are exactly
24,386 unique wellheads present in the set of 4,553,875 string-months in the post-1984
data.
There are two variables that address injection in the OGOR-A data. I discussed
one of these, “injection volume,” at the beginning of this section but have only alluded
5The data extend through March of 2011.
6These observations report any of the following codes for the well status variable (described
later in this section): “wellbore temporarily abandoned,” “completion abandoned,” or “plugged and
abandoned/sidetracked.” In all of these instances, the string is incapable of production.
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to the second one: “well status code.” This is marked as entry “16” in Figure 4.1 and
“indicates the operational status of a particular well during a production month...”
(Minerals Management Service (2002), page H-1). For the string-months in Panel (1)
of Table 4.1, the most common codes (indicating active and idled oil and natural gas
production during the month) account for over 96% of all string-months. The next
most common code, reported for 76,661 string-months (or 1.68%), represents “water
injection (active or inactive).”7
Given the two variables described above, two ways of examining injection in the
OGOR-A data are apparent. Panels (2) and (3) of Table 4.1 represent each represent
one of these methods. Starting with the topmost frequency in Panel (2) – there were
103,474 string-months for which the reported status was “water injection” in at least
one month during the sample period 1/1985-3/2011. I interpret these observations as
constituting the panel of 631 strings that are capable of water injection, distributed
among 135 leases on 73 fields. The 131,915 observations listed in the first row of Panel
(3) in 4.1 encompass the set of string-months that had positive injection volume in
at least one month during the sample period 1/1985-3/2011. One weakness of the
OGOR-A data is that the injection volume variable alone does not reveal which
material is being injected, and no companion variable exists to indicate whether it is
water or gas. In an attempt to ensure that the 131,915 observations do not include
entries for strings that were injecting gas, I eliminated all string-months for any string
that had “gas injection (active or inactive)” reported for its well status code for at
least one string-month.8 This group of string-months constitutes another panel for
strings for which water injection is possible, just by different criteria. In order to
distinguish the two samples, I will refer to the former (in panel (2)), in which strings
7Leaseholders are instructed to “[u]se this code when reporting a well that injects water into the
producing formation for enhanced recovery” (Minerals Management Service (2002), page H-4).
8This code is reported for 17,485 observations in post-1984 sample, or 0.38%. Another weakness
of these data (at least from the standpoint of examining gas injection) is that the “gas injection
(active or inactive)” code does not distinguish between natural gas and carbon dioxide, the costs of
which will likely differ.
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were reported as injectors, as “sample 1,” and the latter (in panel (3)), in which
strings practiced water injection at some point, as “sample 2.”
Two things are striking about 4.1. First, from the standpoint of the number of
units practicing injection, water injection is rare. Slightly more than 1% of all strings
ever perform any injection. This is not surprising as most strings will be devoted to
oil and natural gas extraction, and as we move to subsequently higher levels in the
data, the number of units with any water injection at all accounts for a slightly higher
percentage of all units. Still, less than 10% of all fields (the level at which we would
expect to see injection being the most common, as injection treats reservoirs, of which
a field might have several) have had any water injection in the data. Second, the two
criteria for identifying strings that ever water injection produce relatively different
samples – specifically, barely 50% of the strings in the reported injection sample are
also in the positive injection sample and just over 44% of the strings in the positive
injection sample are also in the reported injection sample. Given that it is not clear
which of these samples is a better representation of the water injection that occurred
in the Gulf of Mexico during the sample period, I will estimate the empirical model
for both.
4.4 Theory
In order to generate empirically testable implications for firms’ injection behavior,
I develop a theoretical model for extraction of an exhaustible resource below. I follow
the lead of Amit (1986) in proposing a two-phase model, albeit the model presented
here is vastly simpler. Furthermore, for the theory below regarding the second phase
of production follows chapter 18 of Neher (1990) on exhaustible resource extraction
with stock effects. The two phases of production correspond to primary recovery and
secondary recovery.
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4.4.1 Primary Recovery Phase
The operator does not control the production rate as all drive energy is provided
by the reservoir. Of course, this pressure is being depleted as extraction continues
– a phenomenon that is modeled by applying exponential decay to the extraction
function:
xt = x0e
−γt (4.1)
Letting bt represent the amount of the deposit at t (where b0 equals the original size
of the deposit), the resource constraint implies
bt =
(
b0 −
t∫
0
xsds
)
≥ 0 ∀t.
It turns out that the firm’s only control variable is t and it only chooses a value
for that control once (rather than at every point in time). The firm’s problem is
to optimally select a value t (denoted T1) when it will switch to secondary recovery.
Before proceeding, I make the following simplifying assumptions: the price of oil (p)
is constant; the cost of primary phase production (c) is constant;9 the interest rate
(r) is constant; the firm is competitive, and the resource is homogenous and known
to be available in a fixed quantity (b0). The firm’s optimization problem is:
max
T1
V1 + V
∗
2 =
T1∫
0
[px0e
−γt − c]e−rtdt+ V ∗2
where V ∗2 is the expected payoff from the secondary recovery phase under the assump-
tion that the optimal path of injection would be adopted, given current information.
9This could be labor and materials costs and the opportunity cost of productive capital in place.
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4.4.2 Secondary Recovery Phase
Once the switch is made to the secondary recovery phase, the operator can control
extraction via injection of water, w, into the reservoir. Thus 4.1 becomes:
xt = F (w, b) (4.2)
where extraction is increasing in both “inputs” (Fw > 0 and Fb > 0) but at diminish-
ing rates (Fww < 0 and Fbb < 0) and both inputs are complementary (Fbw = Fwb > 0).
With the level of b, the amount of oil currently remaining, positively affecting extrac-
tion, there is a stock effect. As oil is removed from the reservoir due to continued
extraction, a given level of extraction can only be maintained by the application of
more water (i.e. with more injection).
Turning to the firm’s optimization problem in the secondary recovery stage, it is:
max
w
V2 =
T2∫
T1
[pF (w, b)− cww − c]e−rtdt
s.t. b˙ = −x
and b0 ≥
T2∫
T1
F (w, b)dt
where cw, the per unit cost of water injection, is assumed constant. Note that with the
pressure maintenance provided by injection, the exponential decay factor is removed
from the objective function. Before proceeding, having specified the objective function
during secondary recovery, we can briefly return to the primary recovery stage to note
the following:
T1 = min
{
1
γ
ln
(
px0
c
)
,
1
γ
ln
(
px0
pxT1(w
∗(t)
T1
)− cww∗(t)T1
)}
,
113
where w
∗(t)
T1
is the optimal water injection at T1 (as determined by the firm at t when
it is considering switching to secondary recovery). The first value represents the point
when profits become negative from primary recovery while the second value equals
the time when secondary recovery becomes more profitable than primary recovery.10
Turning back now to the secondary recovery problem, the present value Hamilto-
nian takes the form
H = pF (w, b)− cww − c+ q(−F (w, b)),
where q is the shadow resource price. The necessary conditions for the optimal pro-
gram are:
(p− q)Fw = cw (4.3)
q˙ = rq − (p− q)Fb (4.4)
b˙ = −F (w, b). (4.5)
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Empirical Analysis
In the earlier discussion of primary recovery, I noted that the diminution in drive
energy due to oil production from a given reservoir is determined by characteristics
specific to that reservoir. The shape of the drive energy profile will then determine
if and when the operator will engage in an injection plan. Unfortunately, reservoir
characteristics are not observed in the OGOR-A data. For this reason, I do not
empirically examine the firm’s decision to invest capital (drilling a well, etc.) so
as to gain injection capability. I want to be confident that field unobservables are
10I assume that the cost of transition from primary to secondary recovery is zero. In reality, the
leaseholder would likely have to drill a well. If that cost is fixed, however, the analysis is essentially
unchanged.
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sufficiently similar across strings – which dictated my choice of samples 1 and 2 in
the previous section – so, I limit the samples to strings that are already able to inject
(either because they do so in the data or the operator claims that they can).
From the theoretical model presented in the previous section for the secondary
recovery phase, I propose the following reduced form empirical model:
volim = β0 + βppm + βrrm +
βd
[ 1
depthi
]
+ βpd
[ pm
depthi
]
+ βa1ageim + βa2
[
age2im
]
+ εim (4.6)
for string i in calendar month m.11 The dependent variable volim is string i’s volume
of water injection into its reservoir during month m; pm is the average spot price
of oil for m; rm is the annualized Treasury bill rate in m for T-bills with a 13-week
maturity; depthi is the depth in feet of the well in which string i resides, and ageim is
the number of years at m since the field to which string i belongs first produced oil
or natural gas. The variables in this specification have been chosen to be consistent
with the model presented in the previous section. Specifically, pm obviously represents
price in that model, while the other variables here are determinants of costs in the
optimal control model.
Before proceeding to the estimation, it is useful to examine some descriptive statis-
tics, in particular, comparing samples 1 and 2 in Tables 4.2 and 4.312 First, because
the paper’s interest lies in examining how injection volume responds to changes in
the oil price, its useful to see if their is any suggestive evidence of a relationship
at the aggregate level. Interestingly, the top panel of Figure 4.2 shows that water
injection has not been as widespread since the mid-1990s as it was during the late
1980s and early 1990s, however, a roughly similar amount of injection (in barrels) has
11To be precise, the data cover all months January 1985 through March 2011.
12Note that on the page containing Tables 4.2 and 4.3, the top and bottom panels contain results
for samples 1 and 2, respectively. This is the convention adopted for all tables and figures in the
paper with the exception of Figures 4.1 and 4.2).
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actually occurred. Furthermore, injection in the latter half of the time series seems
to be potentially influenced by oil price. Also, I would have liked to have produced
a distribution of the time from first production to first injection, in order to get a
better sense of when injection first occurs. Unfortunately, injection data is appar-
ently missing for 1984 and earlier. As an alternative, I plot kernel densities for age of
string’s field conditional on positive injection in the month for both samples in Figure
4.3. These suggest that water injection is largely the domain of older fields (which
is consistent with the model presented earlier), for example, approximately 75% of
the strings that inject in the given month are on fields that are at least 15 years old.
Finally, a quick comparison of samples 1 and 2 in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 reveals them to
be quite similar. The differences in variable means are all well within one standard
deviation (using the variable standard deviations from either sample, as they are of
similar magnitude between the samples). Aside from allowing for the comparison of
the two samples, Tables 4.2 and 4.3 also reveal how infrequent water injection really
is, occurring for less than 15% of the (aggregate) string-months conditional on the
string being injection-capable.
Although I estimate different versions of the base specification, in discussing the
regression results, I will focus on 4.6 and its full set of RHS variables. Tables 4.4
and 4.5 present pooled OLS estimates for 4.6. The results between the two samples
are largely consistent with perhaps sample 2 yielding somewhat more muted effects.
The results also conform to economic intuition. A one percentage point increase in
the T-bill rate causes a drop of approximately 1,400 or 2,000 barrels (depending on
the sample) of water injection – estimates that are consistent with water injection
constituting costly investment. Furthermore, given that water injection is a response
to the loss of drive energy due to sustained production over time, intuitively we would
expect the effect on injection of an additional year of field age to be positive in later
years. For samples 1 and 2, the marginal effect of an additional year of age on water
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injection switches from negative to positive at 52.9 and 50.8 years, respectively.
The main results relate to the price of oil. While I would like to estimate the
price elasticity of injection, Tables 4.2 and 4.3 indicate how common zero values are
for the injection volume, which complicates the use of a natural log transformation
of the injection volume. As a very rough approximation, I compare the estimate
coefficients with the samples means. For sample 1, a $1 increase in price increases
water injection volume by 964 barrels, which is 9.5% of the sample mean of 10,152
barrels for the month. The analogous number for sample 2 is 647 or 7.5% of 8,584
barrels. The specification is also flexible in that the price effect can be measured
for different borehole depths. Intuitively, one would expect that the deeper the well
in which the water is being injected, the more costly is that injection. Graphs of
the effect of price on injection are presented in Figure 4.4. As can be seen for both
samples, the effect of an additional $1 on price is increasing in depth.
Given the fact that the same string can appear multiple times (for different
months) in these data, in the estimation I cluster the standard errors on the string
value. The resulting estimates and confidence intervals are graphed in Figure 4.4.
With the standard errors clustered on string, the price effect is positive and signifi-
cant at most depths occurring in samples 1 and 2. When I allow the error term in
4.6 to be correlated between strings on the same field (i.e. I cluster on field rather
than string), however, I can no longer reject the null hypothesis that the price effect
is zero.13 In both panels of Figure 4.4, clustering on field rather than string changes
the confidence intervals from the narrow band to the wider band. The wider band
falls on both sides of zero, so we fail to reject the null that there is no price effect
(if we believe that we are estimating the variance-covariance matrix correctly). Note
that Tables 4.6 and 4.7 are the full set of analogous regression results with clustering
13One can imagine a scenario where injection by different strings on the same field at the same
time was negatively correlated. Given the large number of months represented in these data for the
same field, I think that caution should be exercised in embracing the results with standard errors
clustered on field.
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on field.
4.5.2 Discussion
While the results presented above are informative, their value might be better
appreciated with some additional context. Society is not interested in water injection
per se, but rather in how much additional oil production is induced by injection.
Separating production that is marginal to injection from that which is inframarginal
is a difficult task, however, so the remarks to follow will be abstract in nature.
Let ρ represent the “conversion rate” of injected barrels of water into extracted
barrels of oil (over and above the level of extraction that would be achieved in the
absence of injection). For simplicity, assume that it is constant.14 Recalling that
for sample 1, a $1 increase in oil price increases water injection by an estimated 963
barrels, note that this translates to 963ρ−1 more barrels of oil produced (due to a
change in injection alone) by the average string. On the flip side, a $1 decrease in oil
price decreases monthly water injection by an estimated 963 barrels meaning 963ρ−1
fewer barrels of oil produced. In the context of the royalty rate, τr, applied to the per
barrel price of oil, p, the average decrease in oil produced per string per month would
be (τrp)963ρ
−1 due to the presence of the royalty on oil. Interestingly, the higher the
conversion rate of water-to-oil (i.e. the more water that must be injected per each
additional barrel of oil removed), the smaller is the number of “lost” barrels of oil per
string and therefore the smaller is the welfare loss due to the royalty. Of course, any
policy prescriptions ultimately will require a reliable estimate of ρ.
Finally, one concrete application for this research relates to the U.S. government’s
Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), an emergency fuel store maintained by the U.S.
Department of Energy. This research suggests an alternative to tapping the SPR:
cutting the royalty rate for older fields where injection is happening. As we have
14For example, ρ = 10 would mean that 10 barrels of injected water are required to produce one
additional extracted barrel of oil.
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already seen, this will increase injection and therefore production, though the size
of the production increase will depend on ρ. If ρ is large and there are very few
producing strings, however, this targeted suspension of the royalty will likely not
produce a sufficiently large quantitative response in total production.
4.6 Conclusion
I estimate that a $1 increase in monthly average oil price leads to a 647 to 964
barrel increase in water injection. Although an elasticity might be the preferred
parameter to a marginal effect from the standpoint of policymakers, the fact that
monthly injection volume is zero for never less than 85% of the sample complicates
its estimation. Nonetheless, because the presence of the royalty mimics an oil price
increase, these estimates carry important implications for the design of optimal leasing
policy (particularly with regard to the royalty) for fields that no longer are in the
primary recovery phase. The royalty’s indirect effect on production via its direct
effect on injection represents a less obvious source of welfare loss, and one that can
be quantified through further research.
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Figure 4.1: OGOR-A Form.
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Figure 4.2: Water injection in U.S. Gulf of Mexico, 1985-2010.
121
Figure 4.3: Field age at month of water injection for samples 1 and 2.
122
Figure 4.4: Marginal effects of oil price by well depth.
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Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum
Injection Volume 10,152 51,998 0 2,318,843
Injection Indicator 0.1380 0.3449 0 1
Oil Price 29.85 20.91 11.31 134.02
Interest Rate 4.64 2.14 0.03 8.82
Depth−1 (Well) 0.0105 0.0031 0.0037 0.0375
Oil Price×Depth−1 0.3113 0.2402 0.0542 3.14
Age (Field) 31.53 11.56 0 61.9
Age2 1,128 712.56 0 3,831
N 102,670
Note: depth measured in 100’s of feet and age measured in years.
Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics for sample 1.
Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum
Injection Volume 8,584 48,684 0 2,318,843
Injection Indicator 0.1479 0.3550 0 1
Oil Price 30.19 21.24 11.31 134.02
Interest Rate 4.53 2.12 0.03 8.82
Depth−1 (Well) 0.0108 0.0035 0.0037 0.05
Oil Price×Depth−1 0.3261 0.2643 0.0542 6.70
Age (Field) 27.94 11.88 0 62.9
Age2 922 689.18 0 3,956
N 130,742
Note: depth measured in 100’s of feet and age measured in years.
Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics for sample 2.
125
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Oil Price 119.7∗ 1,175∗∗∗ 147.04∗ 963.5∗∗
(2.20) (3.32) (2.44) (2.87)
Interest Rate -759 -768 -1,771∗∗ -1,958∗∗∗
(-1.61) (-1.66) (-3.06) (-3.32)
Depth−1 (Well) 1,033,596 -75,763
(1.57) (-0.11)
Oil Price×Depth−1 -103,376∗∗∗ -77,461∗∗
(-3.37) (-2.81)
Age (Field) -3,416∗∗∗ -2,867∗∗∗
(-5.68) (-5.13)
Age2 37.3∗∗∗ 27.1∗∗∗
(4.87) (3.50)
Constant 10,095∗∗∗ -38.51 79,588∗∗∗ 75,163∗∗∗
(3.58) (-0.00) (6.03) (4.86)
N 102,670 102,670 102,670 102,670
R2 0.0047 0.0353 0.0853 0.1133
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 4.4: Estimates for sample 1 – SE’s clustered on string.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Oil Price 81.9 636.5∗ 147.4∗∗ 647.4∗
(1.90) (2.25) (2.77) (2.45)
Interest Rate -322.9 -362.8 -1,426∗ -1,390∗
(-0.84) (-0.95) (-2.58) (-2.58)
Depth−1 (Well) 139,620 200,981
(0.35) (0.55)
Oil Price×Depth−1 -52,106∗ -47,316∗
(-2.12) (-2.21)
Age (Field) -1,693∗∗∗ -1,576∗∗∗
(-4.62) (-4.07)
Age2 16.73∗∗∗ 15.50∗∗
(3.69) (2.81)
Constant 7,573∗∗ 6,495 42,475∗∗∗ 38,330∗∗∗
(3.13) (1.20) (4.97) (4.17)
N 130,742 130,742 130,742 130,742
R2 0.0019 0.0208 0.0350 0.0494
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 4.5: Estimates for sample 2 – SE’s clustered on string.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Oil Price 119.8 1,176 147.2 964
(1.08) (1.43) (1.23) (1.35)
Interest Rate -758.3 -767.5 -1,770 -1,957
(-0.76) (-0.78) (-1.39) (-1.53)
Depth−1 (Well) 1,033,893 -75,526
(0.87) (-0.07)
Oil Price×Depth−1 -103,394 -77,493
(-1.48) (-1.33)
Age (Field) -3,417∗∗ -2,868∗∗
(-2.95) (-2.99)
Age2 37.3∗∗ 27.2∗
(2.67) (2.18)
Constant 10,092∗ -45.8 79,604∗∗ 75,178∗∗
(2.01) (-0.00) (2.98) (2.81)
N 102,666 102,666 102,666 102,666
R2 0.0047 0.0353 0.0853 0.1134
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 4.6: Estimates for sample 1 – SE’s clustered on field.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Oil Price 81.9 636.5 147.4 647.4
(0.99) (1.27) (1.33) (1.36)
Interest Rate -322.9 -362.8 -1,426 -1,390
(-0.44) (-0.49) (-1.21) (-1.24)
Depth−1 (Well) 139,620 200,981
(0.22) (0.32)
Oil Price×Depth−1 -52,106 -47,316
(-1.27) (-1.31)
Age (Field) -1,693∗ -1,576∗
(-2.18) (-2.06)
Age2 16.7 15.5
(1.83) (1.55)
Constant 7,574∗ 6,495 42,475∗ 38,330∗
(2.19) (0.90) (2.36) (2.35)
N 130,742 130,742 130,742 130,742
R2 0.0019 0.0208 0.0350 0.0494
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 4.7: Estimates for sample 2 – SE’s clustered on field.
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CHAPTER V
Conclusion
Offshore sources, in both shallow and deep waters, are increasingly important
contributors to global oil and natural gas production. Furthermore, given that these
sources exist in the territorial waters of national governments, it is these governments
that will have tremendous influence over how these resources reach the market, if at
all. For example, two basic elements of any nation’s hydrocarbon leasing program
– the royalty rates levied on production in exchange for mineral rights and the geo-
graphic dimensions of a leased unit – have potentially important welfare implications
(as examined in chapters 1 and 2, respectively). Obviously, understanding the ef-
ficiency characteristics of an existing policy is essential for informing policymakers
about where such a policy might be improved. In this dissertation, I have applied
both theoretical and empirical models to oil and gas leasing microdata collected by
the U.S. federal government for the Gulf of Mexico in order to better understand
issues of public economics within offshore hydrocarbon investment and production.
In Chapter 1, using variation in royalty rates introduced by a policy called the
Deep Water Royalty Relief Act (DWRRA), I find that the potential for a royalty
payments waiver: (1) increases the probability that an individual tract is acquired
by an average of 193% (a mean increase of 5.6 percentage points); (2) decreases the
probability that a lease is ever drilled during its observed lease term by an average
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of 14.5% (a mean decrease of 1.3 percentage points); and (3) increases the expected
number of explored leases by 150%. The introduction of DWRRA also increases the
average winning bid per lease by 60%. One potential implication for policy: if the
revenue lost due to a royalty waiver is largely offset by increases in the winning bids,
then this modified contract structure improves welfare without completely surren-
dering revenue (because the profit-sharing disincentive is removed, at least in some
circumstances).
In Chapter 2, I estimate the implied value of information spillovers in oil and
natural gas exploration via an event study design. Examining cumulative unpredicted
daily stock returns for firms owning leases adjacent to a lease where a hydrocarbon
discovery occurs during the trading days immediately preceding and following that
discovery, I interpret the accumulated returns as the value of new information. A
potential implication of this research is that if information externalities are large in
value relative to the cost of exploratory drilling, then the amount of exploration is
below the welfare-maximizing level as prospective explorers do not take into account
the high value of information that their activity could generate for their neighbors.
The results imply that this is the case: firms that own leases adjacent to the discovery
lease (but not the discovery lease, itself) realize an average abnormal return that
translates to $315 million in market capitalization (an effect which is quantitatively
large compared to average costs for drilling an exploratory well).
In Chapter 3, I measure how oil price affects water injection, a method for pro-
longing the productive lifetime of oil fields. I find that a $1 rise in price increases the
water injected into the well’s reservoir by approximately 650 to 950 barrels, equalling
7.5 to 9.5% of the mean monthly injection volume (depending on the sample cho-
sen). Equating the estimated price effect with a potential tax effect, this finding has
implications for how the government levies a royalty on mature oil fields for which
operators invest in pressure maintenance.
129
The findings in this dissertation have implications for the structure of oil and
natural gas leasing in the U.S. and elsewhere. With reserves of “easy” oil from con-
ventional onshore fields ever dwindling, the importance of hydrocarbons derived from
remote and technically-challenging sources, deep water in particular, will continue to
grow. So too, will the need for sound policy that maximizes the social value of such
scarce resources.
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